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With the transfer of sensitive information through a borderless and vulnerable cyber world in-
formation security has become vitally important to businesses. Companies now depend upon 
information systems to conduct routine, important and critical business processes and protec-
tion of the underlying systems is crucial to their success. Information systems are subject to 
threats that can seriously affect business operations, organisational assets and reputation by 
exploiting vulnerabilities which can compromise the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of 
processed and transmitted information. 
Company X commissioned this research project to investigate the status of their information 
systems and identify, present and discuss improvements. By understanding the current compa-
ny procedures in complying with international standards, binding contractual obligations and 
customer specific requirements it could be established how this has influenced the development 
of the information systems security to date and how security could be improved to meet future 
needs. An appropriate industry standard information security risk assessment (ISRA) framework 
for developing improved information system security controls was researched and selected. 
The practical element of the research project used the OCTAVE Allegro ISRA to interrogate the 
performance of selected areas of the company’s existing IT infrastructure to collect data and 
understand how the component parts of the system assisted daily business functions and the 
impact on the business should their failure occur. From the results of the ISRA a development 
plan was proposed to assist the company with implementing information system security control 
improvements and a company-wide information security awareness training programme. 
The results of the research project indicate that companies of a similar size and position to 
Company X should regularly reassess their IT information security by implementing one of the 
many readily available industry standard ISRA frameworks. The study also indicates that the 
analysis and selection of appropriate security controls for an information system is a critical task 
that can have major implications on the operations and assets of a company as well as the wel-
fare of individuals who use, are in contact with, or are responsible for these systems. 
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TIETOJÄRJESTELMÄN TURVAKONTROLLIEN 
ARVIOINTI JA KEHITTÄMINEN –  
TAPAUSTUTKIMUS: YRITYS X 
Arkaluonteisen tiedon siirtyminen haavoittuvaan kybermaailmaan on osaltaan aikaansaanut 
sen, että tietoturvallisuudesta on tullut elintärkeä osa liiketoimintaa. Yritykset ovat riippuvaisia 
tietojärjestelmistä liiketoiminnassaan ja näin ollen niiden suojaus on keskeistä menestyksen 
takaamiseksi. Tietojärjestelmät ovat alttiita uhille, jotka saattavat vakavasti vaikuttaa yrityksen 
liiketoimintaan, kilpailuetuun sekä maineeseen. Haavoittuvuuksien hyväksikäyttö saattaa 
vaarantaa tiedon luotettavuuden, eheyden ja saatavuuden. 
Yritys X antoi toimeksi tämän tutkimuksen tutkiakseen tietojärjestelmiensä tilan sekä 
esittääkseen tilanteeseen mahdollisia parannuksia. Yrityksen nykyisten käytäntöjen 
mukauttamisen tarve kansainvälisiin standardeihin, sopimusvelvoitteisiin ja asiakkaiden 
vaatimuksiin ovat olleet perustana tietojärjestelmäkehitykselle sekä ohjaavat mihin 
vastaisuudessa tulisi suunnata. 
Tutkimuksen käytännön osiossa hyödynnettiin OCTAVE Allegro –kehikkoa yrityksen IT-
infrastruktuurin osa-alueiden toimivuuden arviointiin. Tietoa keräämällä pyrittiin ymmärtämään 
miten järjestelmän eri osiot edesauttoivat päivittäistä liiketoimintaa ja mitkä olisivat vaikutukset, 
mikäli niihin kohdistuisi häiriöitä. Riskikartoituksen tuloksena laadittiin ja esitettiin yritykselle 
suunnitelma tarvittavien tietoturvatoimien kehittämiseksi ja yrityksenlaajuisen 
tietoturvakoulutuksen järjestämiseksi. 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että yrityksen X kokoluokan ja samalla tavalla asemoituneiden 
yritysten tulisi säännöllisesti arvioida tietojärjestelmänsä käyttäen saatavilla olevia 
riskikartoitusmenetelmiä. Tutkimus myös näyttää toteen, että tietojärjestelmän turvatoimien 
arviointi on kriittisen tärkeä toimenpide, jolla voi olla merkittäviä vaikutuksia yrityksen 
toiminnoille. Lisäksi asialla on vaikutusta myös tietojärjestelmistä vastuussa olevien ja 
tietojärjestelmiä käyttävien henkilöiden hyvinvoinnille. 
 
ASIASANAT: 
Tietojärjestelmien turvallisuus, turvallisuusvaatimukset, riskien arviointi, turvallisuusriskit, uhat, 
haavoittuvuudet, turvatoimet, järjestelmäkehitys, riskien seuranta, riskien hallinta. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Information systems 
Today’s information systems are a complex assembly of technology compro-
mising hardware, software, firmware, processes, and people, working together 
to provide companies with the capability to process, store, and transmit infor-
mation in a timely manner to support various missions and business functions. 
The degree to which organisations have come to depend upon these infor-
mation systems to conduct routine, important and critical aspects of their busi-
ness means that the protection of the underlying systems is paramount to their 
chances of success (NIST 2010a, 1).  
For many companies, information and the technology that supports it represent 
their most valuable but often least understood assets (Radmanesh et al. 2013, 
1). Managing the security risks associated with the growing reliance on IT is a 
continuing challenge. Companies, similar to the one assessed in this research 
project, struggle to find efficient ways to ensure that they fully understand the 
information security risks affecting their operations and fail to have a system to 
implement appropriate controls to mitigate these risks (GAO 1999, 1). 
Information security is essential for the day-to-day operations in most compa-
nies. Breaches in information security can lead to a substantial impact within a 
company through, for example, financial or operational damage. In addition, an 
organisation can be exposed to external impacts such as reputational damage 
or legal risk, which can jeopardise customer or employee relations or even en-
danger the survival of the company altogether. (ISACA 2012a, 15) 
The analysis and selection of appropriate security controls for an information 
system is a critical task that can have major implications on the operations and 
assets of a company as well as the welfare of the individuals who are in contact 
or responsible for these (NIST 2010a, 1). 
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1.2 Company overview 
Originally founded in the 1940’s, Company X (hereinafter referred to as “the 
company”) is a business located and operated in Finland. The company’s initial 
business activities involved the overhauling of combustion engines for commer-
cial and governmental motor vehicles. However, during the early 1990’s, the 
company’s business strategy dramatically changed leaving behind the auto me-
chanics trade and turning its focus to manufacturing precision-engineered com-
ponents using modern automated CNC machines.  
More than twenty years later, the company has expanded its capacity and cur-
rently employs over thirty-five personnel specialised in performing precision 
machining, surface treatments and mechanical assembly for highly developed 
technologies in both foreign and domestic markets. The company has evolved 
dramatically to become one of Finland’s leaders in the commercial, aerospace, 
and defence manufacturing industries. 
1.3 Current business environment 
The company’s expansion into such a highly specialised market area has been 
rewarded with privileged business opportunities working with prestigious multi-
national aerospace and defence corporations such as Rolls-Royce Holdings 
PLC in the UK, Goodrich and The Boeing Company in the USA, Thales Group 
and Messier-Bugatti-Dowty in France and the SAAB Group in Sweden. Howev-
er, with such privileges has come the progressive requirement for a far more 
disciplined and secure operational environment which involve the company’s IT 
systems that store and transfer data.  
Major global aerospace and defence corporations such as those mentioned 
above ‘outsource’ their business processes to carefully selected suppliers and 
the company is currently one of these. In order for any supplier to enter a con-
tractually binding agreement with a corporation they must first be fully compliant 
with specific globally recognised standards and approved by accredited bodies. 
13 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
Suppliers are ranked and categorised into different capability tiers, which are 
determined by these standards and bodies that they must adhere to. In addition 
to these onerous conditions corporations may also stipulate further obligatory 
requirements that must also be fulfilled. Some of these additional requirements 
can be information security focused and depending on the contractual condi-
tions evidence of continual monitoring and improvement of specific processes 
may need to be presented on demand. 
Any manufacturing and/or assembly work for aerospace and defence contracts 
will involve the handling and circulation of extremely sensitive data primarily in 
electronic format. Such data is commonly utilised in both a supplier’s internal 
and external working environments. For example, data used by a supplier to 
manufacture components in-house will be circulated internally, whilst data ac-
companying a supplier’s outsourced processes will be circulated within an ex-
ternal third party working environment. 
Protecting this data in internal and external environments requires operational 
discipline and rigorous IT system security procedures and controls. The onus 
for ensuring that sufficient system security procedures and controls are in place 
falls to the supplier (the company). Failure to implement, monitor, maintain and 
improve a secure IT environment can breach the requirements of the accredited 
bodies that must be adhered to. These are obligatory contractual requirements 
and any other additional customer specific demands. Major penalties may be 
incurred for breaches such as termination of a contract, loss of accreditations or 
in the most extreme cases legal disciplinary action. 
1.4 Future business environment 
There are only a limited number of companies based within Finland that are 
qualified to manufacture aerospace and defence equipment. Over the next dec-
ade it is anticipated that the company would undertake one or more large-scale 
contracts within these market sectors. At the time of writing this report, foreign 
multinational corporations were in advanced discussions to supply the Finnish 
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defence forces via several long-term contracts for the upgrade of their existing 
aerospace equipment and defence systems. Such corporations are obliged to 
commit to an ‘offset agreement’ programme with one or more suppliers. This 
process starts by inviting a small number of qualified potential Finnish suppliers 
to prepare a tender submission – the company being one of these suppliers. 
‘Offset agreements’ are the means by which the award of defence contracts by 
foreign governments or companies are arranged. They are conditional upon 
commitments from the defence contractor (supplier) to provide some form of 
compensation to the purchaser (BIS 2013). These agreements can include 
mandatory activities such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting 
production, technology transfer, joint ventures, training and foreign investments 
(ACQ 2011) (BIS 2013). 
Countries such as Finland often demand ‘offset agreements’ in order to gain 
economic benefits when spending large sums of government budgets to buy 
defence equipment from foreign suppliers (FT 2013). Benefits can include eas-
ing the burden of large defence purchases on the country’s economy, increas-
ing or preserving domestic employment, obtaining technology transfer or pro-
moting domestic industrial sectors and moderate a country's balance of trade 
(ACQ 2011). 
The company has over twenty years of experience in the aerospace and de-
fence industry and a good reputation in working with globally renowned corpora-
tions. They have an extensive list of prestigious successfully completed con-
tracts, approvals to international standards, accreditations, expert levels of 
knowledge and an extensive range of manufacturing capabilities to draw upon. 
In addition, the company still retains unique export licenses for several key-
manufacturing processes, which enables them to meet most of the more de-
manding contractual requirements and this has helped them to retain a strong 
competitive advantage. 
The anticipated contractual opportunities will be far more demanding than any 
others undertaken previously. More complex manufacturing processes, a wide 
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range of surface treatment procedures and more extensive assembly phases 
are expected. These larger-scaled contracts involve the manufacture of compo-
nents that are linked into an assembly line chain with the production facilities of 
other suppliers. The extent of internal circulation and external exchange of sen-
sitive documentation between the company and third party sub-contractors will 
be substantial. The majority of this documentation will be in electronic format 
and can include highly confidential detailed design drawings, manufacturing 
procedures and supporting technical specifications. All of this data must be 
handled safely, securely and under a strict set of guidelines to ensure that both 
integrity and confidentiality of the data is preserved in accordance with contract 
and/or signed NDA agreement and any customer specific requirements. 
Although the company’s senior management have identified a general need to 
evaluate and improve the existing relatively primitive levels of IT security, there 
is clear evidence that prospective contracts will demand much more stringent, 
advanced and secure IT systems. The IT infrastructure must be developed to 
adequately support the increased volume and movement of sensitive data traf-
fic that will be expected from the larger and more onerous aerospace and de-
fence contracts. This data traffic will travel through internal and external working 
environments.  
1.5 The need for improved information system security 
A considerable step-change is needed to re-build the company’s simple office 
standard IT system security. Senior management has accepted the urgent need 
for the company to invest in the assessment, development and improvement of 
the existing information and network security infrastructure for the following key 
reasons: 
• To meet the demanding technological advances needed to maintain a 
business connection with the specialist aerospace and defence indus-
tries. 
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• To meet the demanding requirements needed to qualify for the more 
stringent, prestigious and higher value aerospace and defence contracts. 
• To develop and maintain the company’s own information security man-
agement system (ISMS) to ensure internal confidence and safety 
amongst company personnel. 
• To keep the company at the forefront of technology and ensure continual 
improvement and investment in IT related activities. 
There is an urgency to strengthen security procedures to assist with the pro-
jected future growth and success of the company. Development and improve-
ments of the IT system security will strengthen the company’s compliance with 
standards and accreditations. The changes will also aim to reinforce compliance 
with the obligatory contractual requirements and customer specific demands for 
information security. This will establish a benchmark standard to reassure both 
present and potential business partners and also benefit company personnel by 
creating a safer, faster and more efficient internal IT working environment. 
1.6 Purpose of this research project 
The purpose of this research project was to perform a thorough information se-
curity risk assessment (ISRA) on the company's existing IT infrastructure includ-
ing the network and system security provisions. The evaluation involves the 
careful selection and use of an established risk assessment framework that has 
evolved through industry best practice and has been adopted by similar sized 
companies with similar IT security challenges. By using a tried and tested as-
sessment methodology the intention was to clearly identify any shortcomings in 
the current security system and propose a detailed plan of action to mitigate any 
identified risks. The plan of action would provide guidance with rebuilding and 
improving the IT system security infrastructure and establish a safer and more 
secure overall operating environment. 
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When formulating the original scope for this research project, senior manage-
ment assigned an investment budget to support and fund the ISRA evaluation 
processes and the implementation of key improvement changes which included: 
• Human resource support, when needed, to assist the ISRA tasks and to 
attend regular project development meetings throughout all phases of 
the research project. 
• Human resource support, when needed, to assist with performing any of 
the necessary minor hardware upgrades to improve the existing IT sys-
tem security.   
• The option to draw upon the support of professional IT server and stor-
age specialists to assist with performing the more complex major hard-
ware upgrades to improve the existing IT system security. 
• The option to draw upon the support of external specialist assistance to 
perform, for example, customised tests on the upgraded IT systems to 
identify any potential security weaknesses. 
• Human resource support, when needed, to assist with the creation of the 
necessary information security policies. 
• The option to draw upon the support of professional training services to 
provide a suitable IT security awareness programme for all in-house 
personnel. 
• Human resource support, when needed, to assist with the monitoring 
and continual improvement of the updated IT system security. 
However, at the time of performing the preliminary stages of the ISRA the scope 
of the original project as outlined above was adjusted and significantly reduced. 
Due to unforeseen circumstances, senior management was advised by the 
board of directors to rationalise the human resources and funding available to 
support this research project. The amended scope required a more streamlined 
and analytical focus. Except for the most critical issues, the implementation of 
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all new IT system security controls was suspended. Although the more complex 
IT infrastructure upgrade plans were to be temporarily placed on hold the low 
cost upgrading would be explored on a case-by-case basis. No major IT in-
vestments were authorised at the time of conducting this research project and 
writing this final report. 
The research project was conducted by an employee of the company (the re-
searcher) who had direct experience developing and working with the IT infra-
structure and had previously participated in many AS and ISO annual audits. 
The researcher worked closely with other key personnel within the company 
including senior management. Regular progress development meetings were 
held between different internal departments in order to draw upon the best ‘in-
house’ expertise and to openly share information. The practical research need-
ed to complete the project objectives was completed in stages over a mutually 
agreed period of time. These research objectives are outlined in chapter two of 
this report. 
Company business operations that are reliant on the IT system infrastructure 
were not to be disrupted during predefined working hours. It was essential that 
the researcher and any other parties assisting company personnel should 
cause the least amount of disruption to daily business operations. For these 
reasons, each and every phase of the project was programmed to an agreed 
timetable with all supporting human resources being informed well in advance. 
In addition, some of the practical elements of research were completed outside 
of the two busier daytime working shifts, which ran from 7am until 11pm. This 
avoided any hindrance to the employees and interruptions to the flow of the re-
search process. 
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2  RESEARCH GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN  
2.1 Research goals 
The goal of this research project is to provide a practical and theoretically sound 
framework of requirements to assist the company in understanding the im-
portance of matching their IT information security systems with the highly de-
manding stipulations for the specialist precision engineering work they are en-
gaged with in the aerospace and defence industries. By implementing and 
managing improved information system security controls recommended as a 
result of this research the company will be able to meet the increasing onerous 
business challenges it will face in the future.   
2.2 Research objectives 
The main objectives of this research project are to: 
1) Identify, present and discuss the company’s information security risk 
status by undertaking an appropriate risk assessment procedure with 
regard to standards, binding contractual obligations and customer 
specific requirements being adhered to by the company. Show how 
these industry specific requirements have affected the way that the 
information systems security has been shaped and how it will be 
developed for the future. 
2) Understand the relevance of the identified criteria and their interaction, 
and select an appropriate industry standard information security risk 
assessment (ISRA) framework for developing improved information 
system security controls.   
3) Perform an ISRA on selected areas of the company’s existing IT 
infrastructure to collect data and understand how the component parts of 
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the company’s IT systems assist with their daily business functions and 
the impact on the business should these fail due to breaches of security. 
4) Propose a development plan from the results of the ISRA to assist the 
company with the implementation of the necessary information system 
security control improvements and an information security awareness 
training programme across the company. 
2.3 Research design 
From the outlined research objectives the main focus of this research project 
was to perform an ISRA of the company’s existing IT infrastructure. The com-
pleted assessment would provide recommendations for improving and rebuild-
ing identified problem areas together with a proposed timeline formulated for 
their planned implementation. To help achieve the research objectives a re-
search design was carefully planned and would be followed throughout the 
course of the project. 
A research design is a systematic plan to study a scientific problem. Myers 
(2013, 19) explains that the main purpose of research design is to provide a 
‘road map’ for a research project. Collis and Hussey (2007, 111) continue to 
describe how it enables project procedures to be planned in detail that are used 
to guide the focus of research and get the most valid findings. The creation of a 
research design involves deciding upon all of the various components of the 
research project, which include the philosophical assumptions, the research 
method, the data collection techniques, the methods used to analyse data, the 
approach used for writing up the project and how the findings are published 
(Myers 2013, 19-20). Table 1 on the following page summarises some of the 
various possibilities for designing a positivist or interpretivist research project. 
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Table 1. A brief summary of options for designing a research project (Myers 
2013, 27) (Collis and Hussey 2009, 74). 
Philosophical assumptions 
 
Positivist Interpretivist 
 
 
Research method 
 
Surveys 
Experimental studies 
Laboratory experiments, etc. 
Action research 
Case studies 
Grounded theory, etc. 
Data collection technique 
 
Experiments 
Quasi-experiments 
Tests and Scales, etc. 
Interviews 
Fieldwork 
Document analysis, etc. 
Data analysis approach 
 
Modelling 
Statistical analysis 
Simulation, etc. 
Hermeneutics 
Semiotics 
Narrative analysis, etc. 
Written record 
 
Thesis 
Research report 
Journal article, etc. 
Thesis 
Research report 
Journal article, etc. 
 
A finalised research design outlines clear guidelines and procedures with regard 
to what is intended in the project and when this will be done. However, while the 
steps summarised in table 1 cover an idealised overview of the different design 
process options, it must be noted that in actual practice it will not always be so 
straightforward. Myers (2009, 19) points out that to a certain degree, a re-
searcher should be flexible and willing to make small adjustments to the design 
as the research project progresses. 
2.4 Identifying the research paradigm (philosophical framework) 
Once the formulation of the research topic, project purpose and objectives were 
firmly established the next step was to investigate and identify a research para-
digm that would provide the best possible guidance to the research project. In 
order to select a suitable research paradigm, it was first crucial to examine the 
core philosophical assumptions that underpin them. Finding the assumptions 
that best aligned with the research project objectives was the primary concern. 
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After this, assumptions made a clearer picture of which research paradigm to 
select. The assumptions that were weighted more towards a particular research 
paradigm influenced its selection to guide the project. 
A research paradigm is an established model or philosophical framework that is 
accepted by a substantial number of people in a research community. Collis 
and Hussey (2009, 55) define it as a “constructive framework that guides how 
research should be conducted, based on people’s philosophies and their as-
sumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge”. Davidson (1998, 1-3) 
emphasises how these philosophies and assumptions will directly affect the way 
in which data regarding a phenomenon should specifically be gathered, ana-
lysed and used. Through the views of Morgan (1979), Collis and Hussey (2009, 
57) describe how a research paradigm can be used to provide research guid-
ance at three different levels: 
• At the ‘philosophical level’, where the term is used to reflect the basic be-
liefs about the world we live in. 
• At the ‘social level’, where the term is used to provide guidance about 
how the researcher should conduct his or her endeavours. 
• At the ‘technical level’, where the term is used to outline the methods and 
techniques, which should ideally be adopted when conducting the re-
search task. 
The two major research paradigms identified in traditional science are positiv-
ism – an objective approach (sometimes called scientific), and interpretivism – a 
subjective approach (also known as anti-positivist) (Galliers 1992, 144-46). The 
positivist approach is usually associated with natural science research whereas 
the interpretivist approach is linked more with social science research. Whilst 
natural sciences are the disciplines that study objects or processes of the phys-
ical nature by means of scientific methods, the social sciences are concerned 
with society and the relationships among individuals within society.  
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Both research paradigms contain adverse approaches and assumptions about 
knowledge and operate at opposite ends of the research spectrum. 
Table 2. Assumptions of the main paradigms (Collis and Hussey 2009, 58-61). 
 
Philosophical assumption 
 
Positivism 
 
Interpretivism 
Ontological assumption 
(the nature of reality) 
Social reality is objective and 
singular. It is concrete and 
separate from the researcher. 
Social reality is subjective and 
multiple. It is a projection of 
human imagination. 
Epistemological assumption 
(what we accept as valid 
knowledge) 
Researcher independent of 
what is being researched. 
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched. 
Axiological assumption 
(the role of values) 
Research is value-free and 
unbiased 
Researcher acknowledges 
that research is value-laden 
and biases are present 
Methodological assumption 
(the process of research) 
Deductive process. 
Quantitative research. 
Context free research. 
Inductive process. 
Qualitative research. 
Context bound research. 
 
Table 2 provides a brief summary of the primary philosophical assumptions that 
underpin the positivist and interpretivist paradigms, which are then discussed in 
further detail in the forthcoming sub-sections. 
2.4.1 Positivism 
Positivism was the first of the two paradigms to emerge and has been described 
as the natural science research model for the study of social phenomenon 
(Lewis and Ritchie 2003, 6). Based on the principles of realism, positivist re-
search is underpinned by the ontological assumption that social reality is objec-
tive and singular and is not affected by the act of investigating it (Collis and 
Hussey 2009, 56). Collis and Hussey (2009, 59) outline that positivist research 
is value free and unbiased since the researcher tries to maintain an independ-
ent and distant stance from what is being researched. 
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Myers (2013, 38) describes how positivist researchers assume that reality is 
objectively given with the belief that only phenomena that are observable and 
measurable can be validly regarded as knowledge. Since it is assumed that so-
cial phenomenon can be measured, positivism is associated with quantitative 
statistical and mathematical methods of analysis (Collis and Hussey 2009, 56). 
Examples of quantitative analytical methods include survey methods, laboratory 
experiments, formal methods (e.g., econometrics) and numerical methods such 
as mathematical modelling (Myers 2013, 7). 
Positivist research involves a deductive top-down process with a view to obtain 
knowledge in an attempt to try and increase the predictive understanding of so-
cial phenomena. The deductive process begins by examining scientific theories 
in order to produce hypotheses from them, which relate to the focus of the re-
search (Greener 2008, 16). This proceeds to experimentation and empirical 
testing to prove or disprove the created hypotheses and accumulate verified 
facts. The results are then used to generate new theory by putting the facts and 
values together to establish causal ‘law-like’ generalisations that apply regard-
less of context (Greener 2008, 16) (Myers 2013, 40).  
2.4.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism is a paradigm that emerged in response to the perceived inade-
quacy of positivism to meet the demands of social scientists and sees society 
as being totally different from natural sciences. Whilst positivism is based on the 
principles of realism, interpretivism has its roots in idealism. Interpretivist re-
search is built on the ontological assumption that social reality is multiple and 
subjective and that the act of investigating social reality will have an effect on it 
because it is shaped by our perceptions. (Collis and Hussey 2009, 56-60) 
Myers (2013, 39) explains how “interpretive researchers assume that access to 
reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such 
as language, consciousness, shared meanings and instruments”. The interpre-
tive researcher aims to see the world through the eyes of the people being stud-
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ied, allowing them multiple perspectives of reality, rather than the single reality 
described in the positivist approach (Greener 2008, 17). Although this form of 
research is value-laden, biases are present since the researcher interacts with 
that being researched and it is impossible to separate what exists in the social 
world from what is in the researcher’s mind (Collis and Hussey 2009, 57). 
Interpretivist research involves an inductive bottom-up process. Unlike positiv-
ism, which primarily focuses on measuring of social phenomena, intepretivism 
focuses on exploring the complexity of social phenomena with a view to gaining 
interpretive understanding. The researcher looks to develop generalisations that 
are more context-bound and closely related to the researcher and his or her 
research methods (Myers 2013, 40).  
Interpretivists adopt a range of methods that seek to describe, translate and 
come to terms with the meaning of naturally occurring phenomena in the social 
world. Interpretivism is associated with qualitative analysis since the research is 
less concerned with the frequency of phenomena and the findings are not de-
rived from the statistical analysis of quantitative data (Collis and Hussey 2009, 
56-8). Examples of qualitative data sources include observation and participant 
observation (fieldwork), interviews and questionnaires, documents and texts, 
and the researcher’s impressions and reactions (Myers 2013, 8). 
2.4.3 The chosen research paradigm – Interpretivism 
Of the two major research paradigms appraised in this report, the philosophical 
assumptions that form the basis of interpretivism were more in balance with the 
context of this research project. The ontological, epistemological and axiological 
assumptions from an interpretivist viewpoint better support the completion of the 
research objectives. With reference to table 2, Collis and Hussey (2009, 59) 
discuss how the first three assumptions are interrelated. This means that if one 
of them is accepted within a particular paradigm and the other two assumptions 
for that paradigm are complementary. 
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Ontology and its assumptions are concerned with the nature of reality. The 
knowledge acquired by the interpretivist approach is subjective and socially 
constructed, i.e., shaped by human perception. Because the interpretive re-
searcher aims to see the world through the eyes of the people being studied 
this enables him or her to view multiple perspectives of reality. During the initial 
stages of this research project it was first necessary to observe, monitor, and 
attempt to understand how company personnel made use of the existing IT in-
frastructure and systems on a day-to-day basis. Dependent on their job re-
quirements and level of authority the reliance and interaction with these IT sys-
tems significantly differed from person to person. Because of the broad spec-
trum of human interaction with the IT framework there were numerous different 
perspectives of reality viewed by the researcher. 
Epistemological assumptions are concerned with what we accept as valid 
knowledge and examine the relationship between the researcher and that being 
researched. Unlike positivist researchers who believe that the researcher 
should maintain an independent stance from that being researched, interpre-
tivists attempt to minimise the distance between the researcher and that being 
researched. Chapter one of this report identified that this research project was 
carried out by an internal employee of the company. In order for the researcher 
to investigate the existing IT infrastructure, complete an ISRA and implement 
the crucial security adjustments it is essential that the researcher shall follow 
and interact within all process and development changes. Due to the interactive, 
cooperative and participative nature of the research it was impossible to divide 
the interaction between the researcher and the subject in hand. 
From an epistemological perspective, Myers (2013, 39) explains that the inter-
pretivist researcher enters the field with some form of prior understanding of the 
research context. He or she should then attempt to look at the subject matter 
from an inside perspective rather than from an outside perspective looking in. 
Before starting this project, the researcher had already worked in the company 
for several years. In addition, the researcher had gained experience working 
with the existing IT framework, had participated in IT development discussions, 
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had an understanding of the social and cultural behavioural patterns within the 
company and had a sufficient level of knowledge about the research topic in 
hand. All of these attributes align the researcher with the epistemological as-
sumptions that underpin the interpretivist paradigm. 
Axiological assumptions are concerned with the philosophical study of value. 
Interpretivists believe that since reality is mind constructed, mind dependent 
and knowledge subjective then social inquiry is ‘value-laden’. Interpretive re-
searchers are influenced by their values, which inform the methods chosen to 
collect and analyse data by their interpretation of the findings and in the way the 
findings are reported. The researcher admits the ‘value-laden’ nature of the 
study and reports values and biases. As an employee of the company and be-
ing directly involved in the research objectives the researcher’s mind-set, per-
sonal values and experience will always influence the research results and can-
not be separated. Due to these influences on the researcher the axiological as-
sumptions that underpin the interpretivist paradigm are suited to this form of 
research project.  
2.5 Identifying the research methodology 
Based on the chosen interpretivist research paradigm the next phase of the pro-
ject was to determine the research strategy. This meant selecting a suitable 
research methodology that broadly reflected the core philosophical assumptions 
of interpretivism. In addition to this the research methodology defined the best 
means or modes of data collection, which after analysis, were used to create an 
eligible plan of action to best solve the predefined research objectives.  
A research methodology can be defined as the systematic, theoretical analysis 
of the methods applied to a field of study. It forms the general research strategy 
that outlines the way in which a research project is to be undertaken and identi-
fies the methods and procedures to be used in it (Howell 2013, 58). Rajasekar 
(2013, 5) explains how these identified methods and procedures define how a 
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researcher manages his or her work of describing, explaining and predicting 
phenomena to gain knowledge. 
There is a wide range of research methodologies for collecting and analysing 
research data with various ways to classify and characterise their different 
types. However, one of the most common distinctions is between the positivist’s 
quantative research approach and the interpretivist’s qualitative research ap-
proach. Table 3 lists some of the main methodologies that are associated with 
the positivist and interpretivist paradigms. (Myers 2013, 7-8) 
Table 3. Research methodologies associated with the two main paradigms (Col-
lis and Hussey 2009, 74) (Myers 2013, 8). 
 
Positivist – Quantitative research 
(A focus on numbers) 
 
Interpretivist – Qualitative research 
(A focus on text) 
 
Surveys 
Experimental studies 
Laboratory experiments 
Mathematical modelling 
Structured equation modelling 
Statistical analysis 
Simulation 
 
Action research 
Case study research 
Ethnography 
Grounded theory 
Semiotics 
Discourse analysis 
Hermeneutics 
Narrative and metaphor 
 
Although the above list is not exhaustive the methodologies mentioned are the 
most commonly used in social and natural science research. Since the interpre-
tivist paradigm had already been chosen for the context of this project the 
methodologies listed in the interpretivist column of the table were investigated 
for their compatibility and suitability to provide the work plan for the research. 
2.5.1 Action research 
Collis and Hussey (2009, 81) describe action research as a methodology used 
in applied research to find an effective way of bringing about conscious change 
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in a partly controlled environment. Unlike other research methodologies, where 
the researcher seeks to study organisational phenomena but not to change 
them, the action researcher is concerned to create organisational change and to 
simultaneously study the process (Baskerville and Myers 2004, 329-30). The 
main role of an action researcher is to assess a situation, attempt to bring about 
a change and then monitor the results (Collis and Hussey 2009, 81). 
Action research is situation-based, context-specific and undertaken by individu-
als with a common purpose (Koshy and Waterman 2011, 3). The research 
combines theory and practice through change and reflection (Avison et al. 1999, 
94). The process involves action, evaluation and critical reflection. Based on the 
evidence gathered changes in practice are then implemented (Koshy and Wa-
terman 2011, 3). It is a highly participatory research methodology with a close 
collaboration and synergy between the researcher and subject. Theorising is 
shared between researchers and client participants with each bringing their dis-
tinctive sets of knowledge into the action research process (Baskerville and My-
ers 2004, 330). The research findings emerge as the action develops, but these 
are not conclusive or absolute. 
The philosophical assumptions that underpin action research are that the social 
world is constantly changing and that both the researcher and the research un-
dertaken are part of this change (Collis and Hussey 2009, 81). Action research 
is an iterative process of enquiry involving researchers and client participants 
acting together on a particular cycle of activities, including problem diagnosis, 
action intervention and reflective learning (Baskerville and Myers 2004, 330-1). 
As a sequence of events, the research works through a cyclical four-step pro-
cess of consciously and deliberately (1) constructing, (2) planning action, (3) 
taking action and (4) evaluating the action. This leads to further planning (con-
structing) and so on (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 8). A simplified model of this 
cyclical four-step process is illustrated in figure 1 on the next page, commencing 
with a pre-step of ‘context and purpose’. 
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Figure 1. The action research cycle (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 8). 
The action research cycle unfolds in real time and begins with a pre-step which 
seeks to understand the ‘context and purpose’ of a project. From an external 
perspective questions are raised to assess the economic, political and social 
forces that drive change whilst from an internal perspective the cultural and 
structural forces are examined. The assessment of these forces identifies their 
source, potency and the nature of the demands they make on the system. The 
pre-step also requires consideration of the collaborative relationships between 
those who have ownership or need to have ownership of the above influences. 
(Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 8) 
The first step of the cyclical four-step process is focused on ‘constructing’ what 
the issues are on the basis of actions to be planned and taken. The constructing 
process is a collaborative venture between the action researcher and other par-
ticipants. The second step involves ‘planning action’ in order to prepare for the 
action to be implemented. It is a consistent follow-on from the exploration of the 
context and purpose and ‘constructing’ the issues. The third step moves onto 
‘taking action’ where the plans are implemented and interventions are made 
collaboratively. The fourth and final step of the research cycle is concerned with 
‘evaluating’. The intended and unintended outcomes of the action taken are ex-
amined in order to identify if the original ‘constructing’ fitted its purpose, if the 
actions taken matched the ‘constructing’, if the action was conducted appropri-
Planning  
Action 
Taking  
Action 
Evaluating  
Action 
Constructing 
Context and Purpose 
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ately, and to determine what is fed into the next research cycle. (Coghlan and 
Brannick 2010, 8-10) (McNiff 2013, 57-8) 
     
Figure 2. A spiral of action research cycles (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 10). 
Coghlan and Brannick (2010, 10) emphasise that in any action research project 
there are multiple action research cycles operating concurrently. The research 
process creates a spiral of self-contained cycles each involving further con-
structing, planning, acting, and evaluating (reflecting). Illustrated in figure 2 the 
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spiral model of cycles provides a researcher with the opportunity to visit a phe-
nomenon at a higher level each time and so to progress towards a greater more 
focused overall understanding of the research problem at hand. 
2.5.2 Case study research 
A case study is a traditional, systematic and versatile research methodology 
involving the exploration of events, collection of data, analysis of information 
and reporting of the results (Wilson 2013, 257). It is an approach that enables a 
researcher to obtain in-depth knowledge by examining and understanding a 
complex social phenomenon (the case) in its natural setting within a particular 
context. Case study research is context driven and can involve either single or 
multiple cases with numerous levels of analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, 534). Yin 
(2014, 4-5) describes how a variety of methods are used to allow the researcher 
to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and real-world perspective. The case 
may be a particular business, a group of workers, an event, a process, a per-
son, or other phenomenon (Collis and Hussey 2010, 82). 
Case study research is very useful when trying to test theoretical models by 
using them in real world situations (Eisenhardt 1989, 534). It involves a more 
realistic, detailed and often intensive study of a particular situation rather than a 
sweeping statistical survey. It is a method used to narrow down a very broad 
field of research into a more easily researchable topic. Case studies allow a lot 
of detail to be collected that would not normally be easily obtained by other re-
search designs. The data collected is typically of better quality than can be 
found using other experimental designs. Whilst a case study will not answer a 
question completely it will give some indications and allow further elaboration 
and hypothesis on a subject. (Shuttleworth 2014). 
Dependent on the type of research questions and their goals there are different 
types of case study design to choose from and in some instances one type may 
be combined with another. The selection of a specific case study design is 
guided by the overall study purpose (Baxter and Jack 2008, 547). Collis and 
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Hussey (2010, 82) explore six different types of case study that are commonly 
used in research as summarised below.  
• Exploratory case studies – where there are few theories to support the 
research case or there is a deficient body of knowledge. 
• Descriptive case studies – where the research objective is restricted to 
describing an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in 
which it occurred.  
• Illustrative case studies – where the research attempts to illustrate new 
and possible innovative practices adopted by particular companies. 
• Experimental case studies – where the research examines difficulties in 
implementing new procedures and techniques in an organisation and 
evaluating the benefits it brings. 
• Explanatory case studies – where existing theory is used to understand 
and explain what is happening. 
• Opportunist case studies – where the opportunity to examine a phenom-
enon arises since the researcher has access to a business, person or 
other case. (Collis and Hussey 2010, 82) (Baxter and Jack 2008, 547-8) 
The main stages in a case study involve (1) selecting the case, (2) preliminary 
investigations, (3) data collection, (4) data analysis and (5) writing up the con-
clusions from the case study material. Case studies typically combine data col-
lection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations 
with the evidence being qualitative, quantitative or a mixture of both.  
2.5.3 The chosen research methodology – Case study research 
After selecting the interpretivist paradigm for its suitability to guide this research 
project the common research methodologies associated with interpretivism 
were thoroughly investigated. From the corresponding methods listed in table 3, 
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the action research and case study methodologies were shortlisted for further 
detailed review. Both approaches were then scrutinised to determine which 
would provide the best fitting and most efficient way to successfully meet the 
research project objectives.  
The first chapter of this report described how unanticipated circumstances with-
in the company had resulted in a number of sudden changes being made to the 
originally approved project scope. At the time of completing the preliminary 
background work for the ISRA, senior management in the company instructed 
that the research project objectives were scaled down and redefined to exclude 
the more costly practical tasks. The excluded tasks were; the investment in im-
plementing tighter information security controls, the necessary software and 
hardware upgrades and an information security awareness-training programme. 
The previously defined research objectives listed at the start of this chapter 
were considerably reduced to concentrate on the IT assessment and improve-
ment proposition stages. 
Based on the original broader project scope, the action research methodology 
would have been selected for its suitability to guide how the research should be 
conducted. Collis and Hussey (2010, 81) clearly define the role of an action re-
searcher as being to enter into a partly controlled environment, implement 
change and to then monitor the results. They also state that action research 
encourages a close collaboration and synergy between the researcher and sub-
ject, which is implicit with the demands of this research project.  
In order to complete the original scope, an employee of the company (the re-
searcher) was to perform an ISRA of the existing internal IT environment, pro-
pose an implementation plan for the recommended changes, implement the 
finalised changes, and then evaluate and continually monitor them to measure 
their improvement. All of these tasks are performed within the company’s inter-
nally controlled IT environment which is continually influenced and developed to 
meet the essential demands of the accredited bodies adhered to, the obligatory 
contractual requirements and any other additional customer specific demands. 
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However, a more limited and streamlined research approach was required, due 
to the narrowed project scope, which removed the practical upgrade implemen-
tation and the post-practical evaluation and reflecting stages. As previously il-
lustrated in figure 1, an action research cycle involves constructing, planning 
action, taking action (implementing) and evaluating (reflecting) action. This 
leads to further similar cycles with each cycle feeding into the next. The revised 
project scope meant that the latter two steps of the cycle, which involved taking 
action and evaluating action, would no longer be completed.  
With only half of the original four-step cycle in operation, the action research 
methodology becomes partially ineffective. Koshy and Waterman (2011, 5) ex-
plain how the concept of spiralling action research cycles are used to provide a 
researcher with the unique opportunity to investigate a problem at a higher level 
each time. This enables the researcher to progress towards a greater overall 
understanding of a particular research problem within a specific context and to 
make informed decisions through this enhanced understanding.  
The reduced project scope significantly diminished the overall benefit of using 
action research. With no practical real-life changes to be implemented the re-
flective learning process driven by change was also removed. With these fac-
tors taken into consideration the ‘action research methodology’ took second 
preference over the ‘case study methodology’, which was adopted for its suita-
bility to gather the relevant in-depth knowledge and still meet the objectives.  
For the purposes of this project the defining beneficial feature of selecting the 
case study methodology is its holistic ‘company-wide’ research approach. It 
provides the researcher with a more robust, realistic and in-depth understanding 
of a research problem. It assists with capturing all of the details of a particular 
phenomenon relevant to the purpose of the study and within a real-life context. 
Eisenhardt (1989, 534) emphasised how case study research is very useful 
when trying to test theoretical models by using them in a real-life context. Ei-
senhardt’s statement supports the intended use of an industry standard ISRA 
theoretical framework or model to assess the company’s existing IT arrange-
ment. The real-life context of the research lays in the risk assessment process, 
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which examines selected areas of the internal IT environment used by company 
personnel on a day-to-day basis in their natural setting. 
Case study research enables a broad research field to be condensed into a 
more manageable research topic whilst retaining a high level of data collection. 
The research involves a more intensive study of a particular situation or specific 
cases rather than a sweeping statistical survey. With the company’s IT envi-
ronment covering such a broad research area it was necessary to limit the re-
search but still ensure valid assessment results. Specific yet different areas 
(cases) of the IT environment were targeted for thorough assessment based on 
the influential accreditations, contractual requirements and customer demands. 
The case study approach supports the project by conducting a more stream-
lined case-specific research process to meet the defined objectives.  
With case study research the researcher is able to go beyond quantitative sta-
tistical results and understand the behavioral conditions through the actor’s per-
spective. This again supports another of the outlined research objectives of this 
research project to find and understand the relationships and interaction be-
tween company personnel and the IT environment. This, along with the data 
gathered from the ISRA will contribute to identifying the final IT system devel-
opment proposals. 
Collis and Hussey (2010, 82) identified six different types of case study that are 
commonly used in research. Since any one type can be combined with another, 
the exploratory and explanatory case types were selected. Exploratory case 
study research is used where there is a clear lack of knowledge and under-
standing of particular areas of the company’s IT environment that need to be 
investigated. Explanatory case study research is used when an existing theory 
or framework is employed to understand and explain what is happening. In this 
instance, an ISRA theoretical framework will be used as a tool to confirm 
whether systems are or are not performing as expected or required.    
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3 EXISTING COMPANY IT INFRASTRUCTURE, ISRA 
METHODS, STANDARDS AND OBLIGATORY 
REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Existing IT infrastructure and its supporting role 
The IT infrastructure forms the backbone of the company. Twenty-five PC work-
stations connect to an internal server via the corporate LAN. The server is pri-
marily used for file sharing and stores several gigabytes of extremely sensitive 
data in electronic format for both active and inactive aerospace and defence 
contracts. This data includes manufacturing drawings, design specifications, 
CNC machining programs, assembly procedures, test reports, binding contrac-
tual information, NDA agreements and similarly valuable content. Dependant on 
the level of authority granted, personnel throughout the organisation are able to 
access particular parts of this data via their individual PC workstations. In addi-
tion to its basic file-sharing services, the server also stores two important data-
bases for the company’s ‘Ventus’ ERP and ‘Fadector’ FMS software systems. 
These two systems are crucial in supporting the company in its day-to-day 
business activities. 
The ‘Ventus’ ERP system is a business management software used to manage 
the primary business functions within the company (Nisamest 2013). The soft-
ware provides a centralised information control system to integrate all internal 
and external management information across the entire organisation (Krmac 
2011, 591). This information includes financial accounting, management ac-
counting, sales, human resources, project management, manufacturing, and 
supply chain management activities (Aptean 2013). ERP facilitates the flow of 
information between the company’s primary business processes within the 
boundaries of the company and is also utilised to enable external connections 
for authorised outside stakeholders (Roots Infocomm 2011). 
38 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
The ‘Fadector’ FMS is used for collecting shop-floor production data. The soft-
ware monitors the status of the CNC machine tools and provides both graphical 
and numerical statistics on their operation (Fastems 2012). Key performance 
indicators are selected and used to measure performance against a goal (Tur-
ban et al. 2011, 298). Data such as machine utilisation, machine availability, 
machine cycle times, mean time between failures, overall equipment efficiency 
and on time delivery are collected, measured, recorded and made openly avail-
able through the software interface (InSolution 2014). Senior management and 
the production managers have access to the ‘Fadector’ software on their PC 
workstations. They use the collated data to analyse, plan and improve manufac-
turing activities such as delivery reliability, decrease of costs, reducing ineffi-
ciencies, increasing capacity and the overall effectiveness of the labour force. 
3.2 Existing ISRA methods in place 
Prior to the start of this research project, the company’s existing mechanisms 
for performing information security risk assessments were relatively primitive 
and troubled with inconsistencies. There were no rigorously documented proce-
dures or an industry standard framework utilised to conduct on-demand risk 
assessments. Many important risk areas were frequently missed or insufficiently 
analysed. Most of the risks identified were only partially mitigated with senior 
management accepting short-term solutions to bypass the problem area and 
focus on continuing business operations as fast as possible. 
In instances where risks were mitigated, no follow-up activities or monitoring 
programmes were used to assess if the implemented corrective actions had 
been successful. With no refined assessment process in place the overall IT 
infrastructure was susceptible to potentially critical openings that could allow the 
integrity of the systems security to be defeated. With such openings not being 
properly addressed the systems were very vulnerable. A breach in the IT sys-
tems security would not only compromise the safety of the company, but could 
also undermine previous and current aerospace and defence contracts. 
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Despite the company’s healthy portfolio of prestigious global aerospace and 
defence contracts, their wide range of manufacturing capabilities, and a well-
established desirable array of surface treatment processes the IT infrastructure 
did not complement this and remained severely underdeveloped. Although no 
major incidents such as data loss, system compromises or critical issues had 
been experienced to date, senior management had failed to acknowledge and 
address their reliance on this critical ageing resource. There was a lack of 
commitment to investigate, upgrade, monitor and maintain the IT infrastructure 
to adequately match and support the company’s growing business demands. 
Management were primarily focused on the investment in more machinery to 
increase manufacturing capacity without realising the importance of also up-
grading the company’s IT infrastructure. 
3.3 Existing standards and specialist requirements adhered to 
The company currently adheres to the ISO and AS globally recognised stand-
ards, which are mandatory requirements for submission of a contract tender for 
the manufacture of any aerospace or defence component. In addition to these 
standards there are other specialist regulatory requirements from other aero-
space and defence bodies that may apply. Each new manufacturing contract 
can also stipulate any other specific requirements that must also be adhered to. 
Compliance with these standards and requirements is reliant directly or indirect-
ly on the integrity of the company’s IT infrastructure. They influence how the 
company should keep pace and develop its ISMS. 
Before any industry standard ISRA framework could be assessed for its suitabil-
ity to be used within the company, a review of the existing standards and regu-
latory requirements was conducted. By understanding the demand and influ-
ence that each standard or requirement had on the company, a foundation of 
information was formed that could be built upon in subsequent stages of this 
research project. Sub-sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4 list and expand on each of the ex-
isting standards and requirements currently in place. 
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3.3.1 ISO 9001:2008 – QMS standard 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) is the world’s largest 
developer of voluntary international standards (ISO 2013a). The ISO 9000 fami-
ly of standards is related to quality management systems (QMS). They provide 
guidance to help companies and organisations that want to ensure that their 
products and services consistently meet customer and applicable statutory and 
regulatory requirements ensuring that the overall level of quality is continually 
developed and improved (ISO 2013b).  
ISO 9001:2008 (version 2008) is based on a number of QMS principles that 
include a strong customer focus, the motivation of and implications for senior 
management, the process approach and continual improvement (ISO 2013b). 
ISO 9001:2008 is one of the most widely used management tools in the world 
today. It is the only standard in the ISO 9000 family that can be certified and 
can be used by any organisation regardless of its size and field of activity (ISO 
2013c). The standard also requires that an organisation must perform regular 
internal audits to monitor and benchmark how its QMS is functioning and per-
forming (ISO 2013b). 
ISO 9001:2008 certification is a basic mandatory requirement for any company 
participating in aerospace and defence contractual activity. Although the stand-
ard has very little focus on maintaining a safe and secure IT environment, it 
does demand a streamlined QMS, which for the company incorporates the use 
of supporting software platforms that are reliant on the IT infrastructure. 
3.3.2 AS9100 – Aerospace QMS standard 
Aerospace standard AS9100, sometimes referred to as BS EN 9100, is a widely 
adopted and internationally recognised QMS that has been specifically tailored 
by SAE to meet the demands of the aviation, space and defence industries 
(Praxiom 2013). The standard covers the entire supply chain, which includes 
companies that design and manufacture equipment, supply accessories or re-
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placement parts, as well as those that offer supply and maintenance, or over-
haul and repair services to the above mentioned industries (SGS 2013a). The 
standard is a mandatory requirement for any company participating in aero-
space and defence contractual activity. Compliance is seen as assurance of a 
continuing commitment to meeting the stringent measures demanded by these 
industries (SGS 2013b, 3). 
SAE International is a globally active professional association and standards 
organisation with their principal emphasis being placed in the aerospace, auto-
motive and commercial-vehicle industries (SAE 2014a). SAE prepare AS9100 
in collaboration with the international aerospace quality group (IAQG) who is a 
cooperative global organisation supported by companies throughout the avia-
tion, space and defence industries (SAE 2014b). IAQG are committed to 
achieving significant performance improvements realised through the develop-
ment of standards, industry oversight, and guidance materials for use in all lev-
els of the supply chain. 
AS9100 incorporates the entirety of the ISO 9001:2008 standard, while adding 
additional requirements specifically relating to quality and safety for aviation, 
space and defence organisations (AS9100 2009, 7). The formula shown in fig-
ure 3 clearly explains how the AS9100 and ISO 9001:2008 standards are relat-
ed to one another. 
       
Figure 3. The AS9100 formula (Praxiom 2013). 
Since aerospace standard AS9100 covers all of the scope contained within the 
ISO 9001:2008 standard it means that by auditing and receiving certification in 
meeting the demands of AS9100, compliance with ISO 9001:2008 is also 
awarded simultaneously (SAE 2014c). Similar to ISO 9001:2008, annual audits 
are compulsory but far more demanding within the aerospace industry. For ex-
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ample, any major non-conformance discovered during an audit would result in 
immediate suspension of the certification. This typically includes a halt in the 
production (work-stop) for any component manufactured under the accredited 
requirements and, if needed, previously delivered components must all be re-
called for detailed inspection. A work-stop can potentially last many months. 
3.3.3 Boeing – Special QMS requirements standard for suppliers 
Boeing is the world's leading aerospace company and the largest manufacturer 
of commercial jetliners and military aircraft combined (Boeing 2013). They pro-
vide products and support services to customers in over 150 countries using a 
global network of Boeing accredited suppliers. In order to compete and win any 
manufacturing contract, Boeing requires that all suppliers must adhere to a pre-
ferred set of standards. They ensure compliance to the AS/EN/JISQ 9100 quali-
ty management systems standard, which covers the entire aerospace supply 
chain (SRI 2013). 
AS/EN/JISQ 9100 is tailored for the aerospace industry and is coordinated by 
the international aerospace quality group (IAGQ). AS/EN/JISQ incorporates ma-
jor elements of the IAQG sanctioned standards, which include AS9100, EN9100 
and JISQ 9100 (Boeing 2011). The standard is primarily based on ISO 
9001:2008 and AS9100, but includes over 100 other aerospace specific quality 
and reliability requirements (SRI 2013). The key focus areas are inspection, 
process-control, and information on documentation, testing and results. All of 
these areas typically include sensitive data that must be handled under an NDA 
agreement and have a strictly defined period of validity.  
The company has several long-term contracts for the manufacture and assem-
bly of Boeing aerospace components. The existing IT system infrastructure is 
used to store and access the associated electronic data on a daily basis. 
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3.3.4 Nadcap – Quality assurance standards for aerospace and defence 
Nadcap (National Aerospace and Defence Contractors Accreditation Program) 
is a globally recognised accreditation program that focuses on achieving a 
tighter control over special processes within aerospace, defence and other 
closely related specialist sectors (Boeing 2010). Established in 1990, Nadcap is 
managed by technical experts and key personnel from globally renowned aero-
space contractors, suppliers, and US government representatives (Keighley 
2013) (PRI-Network 2013a). 
The Nadcap program represents a concerted, cooperative effort to increase 
performance, improve safety and quality, and reduce costs throughout the 
global aircraft and defence supply chains. It defines a standardised approach to 
quality assurance and establishes requirements for accreditation. Comparable 
to other aerospace and defence accreditations, Nadcap requires compulsory 
audits that are organised by the Performance Review Institute (PRI). Expert 
auditors conduct technically in-depth assessments to ensure familiarity and ad-
herence to the special processes in place. (Keighley 2013) 
The company has active Nadcap accreditations for chemical processing proce-
dures in accordance to AC7108 and NDT procedures in accordance to AC7114. 
Both of these comply with the global SAE aerospace standard AS7003 and are 
annually audited by PRI. Any non-conformity issues related to components 
manufactured under Nadcap approval will require more detailed investigative 
audits. Penalties for non-conformance to the standard are similar to those im-
posed within the AS9100 standard. A work-stop, product recall and temporary 
or permanent accreditation suspension are dependent on the severity of the 
non-conformance. (PRI-Network 2013b) 
The company’s two Nadcap accreditations are for special surface treatment 
processes that are solely used for aerospace and defence components. All of 
the data generated from these processes is under a NDA. Documentation is 
usually in paper format but is scanned and stored electronically on the company 
server hard drives. It is a strict requirement for both of the accredited Nadcap 
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standards that all records throughout the processing stages are recorded and 
safely retained for a defined time period, which means securely protecting and 
storing this electronic data. 
3.4 Overall influence on the IT environment 
Each of the preceding accredited standards and specialist requirements de-
mand specific measures that are dependent on the company’s internal IT envi-
ronment to execute the tasks. The complexity of these demands and their reli-
ance on the IT systems varies greatly. For example, an accredited standard 
may demand that detailed CNC calibration records are stored safely in electron-
ic format for a defined ‘shelf life’, whilst a customer may stipulate that the com-
pany must install and maintain a specific software application that safely en-
crypts and transfers the project specific data between the two parties. 
From the four main influential standards and requirements previously described, 
AS9100 is the most rigid, demanding and IT resource dependent of them all. 
The requirements of the ISO 9001:2008 standard are covered under the 
AS9100 scope. AS9100 is supported by document AS9101, which acts as a 
checklist for the customer and auditor who participate in the audit. At the time of 
conducting this research project, there was an increasing emphasis within the 
audit scope to focus on the management of information systems and data con-
trol. AS9101 section 4.2.4 – ‘control of records’ lists the following recent addi-
tions that must be addressed and adhered to:  
• Electronic records of production origin, conformity and shipment must be 
maintained. 
• Back-up procedures and document shelf life are defined for records 
stored in an electronic form. 
• Electronic records shall be stored and secured safely and cannot be cor-
rupted due to software or system changes. (SAE 2010, 27) 
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In addition to the IT related requirements in section 4.2.4, sections 7.5.1.2 and 
7.5.1.3 – ‘control of production’ also require that the following procedures are 
addressed and adhered to: 
• Production equipment, tools and computer software used to automate, 
control, or monitor manufacturing processes shall be validated, inspect-
ed, and updated periodically. 
• Changes affecting equipment, tools, and computer software shall be con-
trolled and documented. (SAE 2010, 42) 
In addition to the above requirements outlined from the AS9100 and AS9101 
documents, Boeing’s AS/EN/JISQ special requirement standard demands an-
other 100 additional contract specific focus areas. Dependent on the complexity 
of the Boeing components to be manufactured, a contract will include the nec-
essary corresponding focus areas that the company must adhere to in order to 
work on such projects. Similar to the AS9100 standard, some of these focus 
areas involve the reliance on the company’s IT systems to execute them.  
A Boeing contractual agreement typically outlines the handling, storage and 
defined shelf life requirements for the project sensitive data circulated. For ex-
ample, manufacturing drawings, design specifications and CNC programmes. 
All Boeing contracts are signed under an NDA agreement. At the time of writing 
this report the company was engaging in the manufacture and assembly of nu-
merous components for several short and long-term Boeing contracts. Due to 
Boeing’s strict confidentiality policy, the specific focus areas outlined in the bind-
ing contractual agreements cannot be disclosed in this report.  
All relevant requirements of the standards and any customer contract specific 
requirements dictate the basis on which the company’s information systems 
security will be developed and tailored from a present and future perspective. In 
addition to the defined research project objectives, the standard and contract 
specific requirements will be taken into account when selecting the appropriate 
ISRA methodology. The objective is to improve the information systems security 
for meeting accredited standards and contractual requirements for securing 
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prospective business opportunities within the highly specialised aerospace and 
defence sector. 
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4 INDUSTRY STANDARD ISRA METHODS, GUIDES 
AND STANDARDS 
4.1 Evaluating industry standard ISRA methods, guides and standards 
With the world wide proliferation of complex and sophisticated threats to data 
security Information Security Risk Assessments (ISRA) have become an essen-
tial tool for organisations to employ as part of an overall comprehensive risk 
management program (NIST 2011, VII). Landoll (2011, 23) defines how a secu-
rity risk assessment is an objective analysis of the effectiveness of the current 
security controls that protect an organisation’s assets and a determination of the 
probability of losses if those threats were realised. The end result of the as-
sessment is to ensure appropriate or strengthened levels of security for the ap-
praised information systems.  
Risk assessments are used to provide senior leaders and/or executives with the 
information needed to understand factors that can negatively influence opera-
tions and outcomes. It enables these decision makers to make informed judg-
ments concerning the extent of the actions needed to reduce risk and to deter-
mine appropriate courses of action to take in response to identified risks (GAO 
1999, 6). A security risk assessment is a continuous process of discovering, 
correcting and preventing security problems. In addition it is used to verify that 
the implementers and operators of information systems are meeting their stated 
security goals and objectives. (NIST 2010a, IX) 
There are various industry standard best-practice security risk assessment 
models and methods available. Depending on the type of methodology em-
ployed a security risk assessment typically has numerous steps or phases each 
having a slightly different approach (Landoll 2011, 23). However, regardless of 
these differences all risk assessments generally include the following generic 
process phases: 
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• Threat identification – To identify threats that could adversely affect an 
organisation’s critical operations and assets. Threats could include such 
things as disgruntled employees, intruders, criminals, terrorists, and nat-
ural disasters. 
• Threat likelihood – To estimate the likelihood that such threats will mate-
rialise based on historical information and the judgment of knowledgea-
ble individuals with relevant experience. 
• Threat Identification – To identify and rank the value, sensitivity, and crit-
icality of the operations and assets that could be affected should a threat 
materialise in order to determine which operations and assets are the 
most important to the organisation. 
• Threat estimation – To estimate, for the most critical and sensitive assets 
and operations, the potential losses or damage that could occur if a 
threat materialises including the recovery costs. 
• Threat mitigation – To identify cost-effective actions to mitigate or reduce 
the risk. These actions can include implementing new organisational pol-
icies and procedures as well as technical or physical controls. 
• Threat documentation – To document the results and develop a plan of 
action to execute the changes needed. (GAO 1999, 6-7) (NIST 2011, 1) 
The purpose considers standardised security risk assessment processes avail-
able. Appropriate internationally recognised security risk assessment methods, 
guides and standards are identified and investigated in order to understand 
their structure, their complexity and to assess possible challenges that may be 
faced when adopting any one of them. The cross-section of options was ration-
alised to four globally respected ‘best-practice’ options. These are ‘COBIT’ and 
‘OCTAVE’ security risk assessment methods, the ‘NIST SP 800’ series of com-
puter security guidance publications and the ‘ISO/IEC 27000’ family of interna-
tional information security standards. The following sub-sections discuss each 
‘best-practice’ option in further detail. 
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4.2 COBIT 
Control OBjectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is a com-
prehensive IT governance control framework and supporting toolset developed 
by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) and the Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA). Since it was first published in 1996, COBIT has 
evolved to become the only industry standard framework that addresses the 
complete lifecycle of IT investment (ISACA 2013a). 
The purpose of COBIT is to provide an up to date, internationally accepted set 
of IT governance principles, practices, analytical tools, models and controls to 
help increase trust in, and value provided by information systems within organi-
sations (ITGI 2007, 9). Generic in format, the COBIT control framework can be 
applied across organisations of all sizes whether commercial, non-profit making 
or within the public sector. The framework is intended for day-to-day use in re-
spect of: 
• Executive management  – to acquire value from IT investments and as-
sist with balancing the risk and controlling investments in an often 
changeable IT environment 
• Business management – to receive assurance on the management, se-
curity and control of IT services provided by internal or external parties 
• IT management – to provide the required IT services that are needed to 
support the business strategy in a controlled and managed approach 
• Auditors – to ratify their opinions and/or to provide better advice to man-
agement regarding the most suitable internal controls to implement. 
(Tarantino 2008, 181) (ITGI 2007, 25) 
The logical structure of COBIT provides a mechanism to simplify the overall im-
plementation process of an IT governance and control framework. It enables 
organisations to establish clear policies and good practice for IT controls in or-
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der to increase the value attained from IT-enabled resources in meeting busi-
ness challenges and regulatory compliance. (ISACA 2013a, 1-6) 
Released almost two decades ago, the COBIT framework has continually 
adapted to meet the demanding changes in the world of business and IT. Initial-
ly modelled as an IT auditing toolset for information systems COBIT has ad-
vanced through five major editions to become the leading globally-recognised 
framework for the governance and management of enterprise IT (Kadam 2012, 
21). Figure 4 illustrates how each of the different iterations have progressively 
modified and extended the framework scope. 
 
Figure 4. The evolution of COBIT frameworks (ISACA 2012a, 5). 
Translated into many languages, all documentation, guidelines and support for 
COBIT 5 and COBIT 4.1 are openly available to download from ISACA’s web 
pages. Published in 2007 and 2012 respectively, both editions are actively used 
across organisations across the world. Since initially released, COBIT’s first, 
second, and third editions of the framework have all been developed, improved 
and consolidated into the fourth and then fifth edition. Due to their out-dated 
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content and diminished online support and availability, COBIT’s first three edi-
tions will not be investigated for the purposes of this research project. 
4.2.1 COBIT 4.1: Control framework for IT Governance and Control 
Prior to the initial release of COBIT 4.0 in 2005, the third edition of the series 
was active for five years (2000–2005). During the lifecycle of COBIT 3, ITGI 
elaborated on the existing business objective principles in greater detail and 
introduced the concept of IT governance into the framework. As enterprises in-
creasingly understood the significant impact that information and IT systems 
had on business success the need for an industry standard IT governance con-
trol framework became apparent (ITGI 2007, 9). With growing demand COBIT 
4.0 was developed to meet these IT governance requirements. 
Two years after COBIT 4.0 was published a revised edition was introduced in 
2007. COBIT 4.1 represented a fine-tuning of COBIT 4.0 to include enhanced 
performance measurement methods, improved control objectives and better 
alignment with business and IT goals (IIA 2013). In addition two further publica-
tions by ITGI were developed to support COBIT 4.1 in 2008 and 2009. The first 
was the Val IT framework for business technology management and the second 
was the Risk IT framework for the management of IT related business risks 
(Kadam 2012, 21). 
The COBIT 4.1 framework is business-focused, process-orientated, controls-
based and measurement-driven. The business orientation of COBIT aligns 
business objectives with IT goals. Demonstrated in figure 5 on the next page, 
COBIT achieves a sharp business focus by managing and controlling IT re-
sources following a structured set of IT processes. This delivers the required 
enterprise information services needed to effectively achieve the business re-
quirements. 
52 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
 
Figure 5. Business-focused: The basic COBIT 4.1 principle (ITGI 2007, 10). 
The process orientation of COBIT 4.1 follows a structured and controlled model 
that represents all of the processes typically found in IT functions. This presents 
a common reference point that can be understood by both operational IT and 
business managers. In addition, the model also provides the capability to 
measure and monitor IT performance, improve communication with service pro-
viders and integrate the best management practices. By incorporating a con-
trolled process model ownership of the process is encouraged which enables 
responsibilities and accountability to be more clearly defined. (Kouns and Minoli 
2011, 179) 
The COBIT process reference model contains 34 high-level IT processes each 
of which is clearly defined with information and examples to describe its inputs, 
outputs, key activities, responsibilities, objectives and performance measure-
ment criteria. The processes are categorised under four interrelated domain 
areas of responsibility: (1) plan and organise, (2) acquire and implement, (3) 
deliver and support and (4) monitor and evaluate (ITGI 2007, 5). The interrela-
tion between these four domain areas is illustrated in figure 6 on the following 
page and then discussed beneath this. 
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Figure 6. The four interrelated domain areas of COBIT 4.1 (ITGI 2007, 12). 
• Plan and Organise (PO) – This covers the strategy, tactics, and identifi-
cation of how IT resources can best contribute to achieving the goals and 
business objectives. 
• Acquire and Implement (AI) – This concerns the identification, develop-
ment or acquisition, implementation and integration of IT solutions into 
the current business processes. 
• Deliver and Support (DS) – This focuses on the delivery aspects of the 
required IT services in accordance with business priorities, optimised 
costs, management of security and integrity, and a workforce that is able 
to use the IT systems productively and safely. 
• Monitor and Evaluate (ME) – This involves the regular assessment of all 
IT services to determine their effectiveness, security, integrity, regulatory 
compliance, and integration to meet business goals. (Raggad 2010, 740) 
(ISACA 2011, 11) 
The controls-based orientation of the COBIT 4.1 framework is represented by 
policies, procedures, practices and organisational structures that are designed 
to provide assurance that the business objectives can feasibly be met. This in-
cludes the prevention or detection of undesired events by appropriate corrective 
action. Effective controls reduce organisational risk, increase the prospect of 
delivering value and improving efficiency since there will be fewer errors and a 
more consistent management approach. (ITGI 2007, 13-14) 
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The framework defines 210 control objectives that are subdivided across its thir-
ty-four high-level IT processes. Within each IT process, the linked control objec-
tives provide action statements that outline the minimum requirements for good 
practice to ensure the effective management and control of the process. In addi-
tion to these action statements, each of the thirty-four IT processes has further 
generic requirements. When considered together, all of these elements com-
prise a complete view of the control-based process. However, understanding 
the roles and responsibilities for the control-based process requirements is key 
to the overall success of the IT governance framework. 
The measurement-driven orientation of COBIT 4.1 builds up an objective view 
of an enterprise’s own performance level. Both corporate and public enterprises 
are increasingly asked to consider how well their IT is being efficiently managed 
and utilised to maximum effect. Enterprises need to measure their current posi-
tion, identify where improvement is required and implement a set of measure-
ment tools to monitor this improvement. COBIT deals with all of these issues by 
providing the following measurement-driven tools: 
• Maturity models – Developed for each of COBIT’s thirty-four IT process-
es, the maturity models enable management to perform benchmark 
analyses, identify and locate issues and prioritise improvements in capa-
bility. Maturity model evaluations are made against a maturity level scale 
ranging from non-existent (0) to optimised (5). The scale includes zero 
(0) since it can be possible that no process exists at all. 
• Performance goals and metrics – These are used to define and measure 
how well a business IT function or IT process is performing in order to 
meet both business expectations and IT goals. Similar goals and metrics 
are used for measuring internal process performance based on balanced 
scorecard principles. 
• Activity goals and metrics – These establish what needs to happen inside 
a process to achieve the required effective process performance and 
how to accurately measure it. (ITGI 2007, 17-23) 
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Figure 7 provides a diagrammatic view of how the already described manage-
ment; control, alignment and monitoring aspects of COBIT 4.1 are linked. CO-
BIT connects the business requirements for information and governance to the 
objectives of the IT services. It enables the IT activities and the resources that 
support them to be properly managed and controlled based on COBIT’s control 
objectives and are aligned and monitored using COBIT’s goals and metrics. 
    
Figure 7. COBIT 4.1 framework model: Management, Control, Alignment and 
Monitoring (ISACA 2007, 24). 
4.2.2 COBIT 5: Business Framework for IT Governance and Management 
Released in 2012, COBIT 5 is the fifth and latest edition of the COBIT series to 
provide the next generation of guidance that assists enterprises in achieving 
their objectives for the governance and management of IT. The framework is 
based on a revised process reference model with a new governance domain 
and several new and modified processes that now cover enterprise activities 
from end-to-end, including business and IT function areas (ISACA 2013c). The 
generic framework is useful for organisations of all sizes and helps to create 
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optimal value from IT by maintaining a balance between realising benefits and 
optimising risk levels and resource use (ISACA 2012a, 13). 
COBIT 5 has compiled, expanded and improved on COBIT 4.1 by consolidat-
ing, integrating and aligning with other major frameworks, standards and re-
sources. The updated structure correlates the knowledge assets previously dis-
persed over ISACA’s COBIT, Val IT, and Risk IT frameworks to provide a sim-
plified and complete enterprise-wide information security assessment process 
(ISACA 2013c). COBIT 5 not only rationalises all of the aforementioned ISACA 
frameworks together but it is also aligned and harmonised with a number of 
other highly successful IT standards and codes of good practice adopted by the 
industry. The following are all covered within the scope of COBIT 5: 
• COBIT 4.1 – IT governance framework and supporting toolset that as-
sists enterprise management to relate IT control requirements, technical 
issues and business risks (ISACA 2013b). 
• Val IT 2.0 – IT governance framework that focuses on value delivery and 
ensures that IT-enabled investments are managed throughout their full 
economic life cycle (ISACA 2009a, 1). 
• Risk IT – framework for enterprises to identify, assess, govern and man-
age IT risk based on a set of guiding principles connecting IT with all 
business operations (ISACA 2009b, 2-4). 
• COSO – integrated framework to enable enterprises to efficiently design, 
implement, evaluate and improve the effectiveness of internal control 
over information systems in order to meet objectives (COSO 2011, i). 
• ITIL – framework of best practices for IT Service Management (ITSM) to 
identify, plan, deliver and support IT services and align these with the 
needs of the business and core business processes (ITIL 2013). 
• TOGAF – de facto standard framework and supporting toolset to provide 
software architects with a structured approach for organising and govern-
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ing their software technology design, development and maintenance 
(opengroup 2006). 
• PMBOK – internationally recognised guidebook presenting a set of fun-
damental processes and guidelines needed to achieve organisational re-
sults and excellence in the practice of project management (PMI 2013). 
• ISO/IEC 27000 series – a family of mutually supporting information secu-
rity standards to provide best practice recommendations on security 
management, risks and controls within the context of an overall ISMS (IT 
Governance 2013).  
• ISO/IEC 9000, ISO/IEC 31000, ISO/IEC 38500 – frameworks for effec-
tive quality management systems, risk management and IT governance. 
In addition to the bulleted items listed above COBIT 5 also incorporates many 
features drawn from the Business Model for Information Security (BMIS) and 
the Information Technology Assurance Framework (ITAF) (Davis and Schiller 
2011, 407). With all of these IT standards and good practices combined in one 
framework COBIT 5 provides a powerful and broad set of tools to enable organ-
isations to execute a wide range of high-level processes across the following 
areas: 
• Audit and assurance – to manage vulnerabilities and ensure compliance. 
• Risk management – to evaluate and optimise enterprise risk. 
• Information security – to oversee and manage IT security. 
• Regulatory compliance – to keep pace with continually changing regula-
tions. 
• Governance of enterprise IT – to align IT goals with strategic business 
objectives. 
COBIT 5 is based on five key principles, which enable organisations to build an 
effective governance and management framework that optimises information 
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and technology investment and use for the benefit of stakeholders. These five 
key principles are illustrated in figure 8. 
                 
 
Figure 8. COBIT 5: Key principles (ISACA 2012a, 13). 
The COBIT 5 framework is not prescriptive in structure but advocates that or-
ganisations implement governance and management processes such that the 
key areas are covered, as shown in figure 9 on the next page. 
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Figure 9. COBIT 5: Key areas of IT Governance and Management (ISACA 
2012a, 32). 
Although similar in structure to COBIT 4.1, the COBIT 5 process reference 
model encompasses significant improvements fully integrating with the Risk IT 
and Val IT process models. The COBIT 5 model represents and describes all of 
the processes normally found in an organisation relating to IT activities and pro-
vides a common reference point to benchmark against. The proposed process 
model is a complete comprehensive model but requires that each organisation 
must define its own processes unique to its own operational environment. (ISA-
CA 2012a, 32-33) 
Whilst the COBIT 4 model categorises thirty-four IT process tasks under four 
interrelated domain areas the COBIT 5 model first establishes two core disci-
plines ‘governance’ and ‘management’. These two disciplines contain a total of 
five domain areas each represented by three-letter abbreviations. There are a 
total of thirty-seven process tasks distributed between the five domain areas. 
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Table 4 gives a clearer perspective of how the disciplines, domains and process 
tasks are related. 
Table 4. COBIT 5: Disciplines, domains and process tasks.  
 
Disciplines 
 
Domain area / number of associated process tasks 
 
Governance of Enterprise IT 
 
Evaluate, Direct and Monitor (EDM) – 5 process tasks 
 
Management of Enterprise IT 
 
Align, Plan and Organise (APO) – 13 process tasks 
  Build, Acquire and Implement (BAI) – 10 process tasks 
  Deliver, Service and Support (DSS) – 6 process tasks 
  Monitor, Evaluate and Assess (MEA) – 3 process tasks 
 
Within the process tasks outlined above COBIT 5 is supported by an implemen-
tation toolkit and other detailed stages. The framework is not intended to be a 
complete solution but rather a guide to avoid commonly encountered problems, 
adoption of good practices and to assist in the creation of successful outcomes. 
Optimal value outcomes are realised when the framework is properly governed 
and adequately managed. 
4.3 OCTAVE 
Originally developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), the Operation-
ally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) approach 
was created to address the security compliance challenges that were faced by 
the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD). Since its initial public release in 1999 
there have been a number of version updates that have developed and im-
proved the underlying framework, methods and criteria to suit different sized 
organisations. (SEI 2007, 1) 
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OCTAVE contains a framework of tools, techniques and methods that have 
been specifically designed for strategic risk-based information security assess-
ments and planning (Panda 2009, 1). The OCTAVE approach is not a product, 
but rather a process-driven methodology to identify, prioritise and manage in-
formation security risks. 
The principal role of OCTAVE is to enable organisations to understand, assess 
and address their information security risks from their own perspective. By fol-
lowing the OCTAVE approach organisations can utilise the framework to make 
effective decisions regarding protection of information based on risks to the con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability of critical information assets. OCTAVE is 
intended to help an organisation to: 
• Develop qualitative risk evaluation criteria that describe the organisa-
tion’s operational risk tolerances. 
• Identify assets that are of most importance to the organisation. 
• Identify threats and vulnerabilities to the identified assets. 
• Determine and evaluate the consequences to the organisation if the 
threats were to be realised. 
• Initiate corrective actions to mitigate risks and create a practice-based 
protection strategy. (SEI 2007, 1) 
There are three distinctive methodologies within the family of OCTAVE infor-
mation security assessments available for public use:  
• The original OCTAVE method – for larger organisations. 
• The OCTAVE-S method – for smaller organisations. 
• The OCTAVE-Allegro method – a streamlined approach for small to large 
organisations. 
The OCTAVE-S and OCTAVE Allegro methods are based on and developed 
from original OCTAVE criteria providing the foundation of the whole concept. 
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These criteria establish the fundamental principles of risk management used 
within all OCTAVE methodologies. Published in 2007, OCTAVE Allegro is the 
most recently developed method whilst the two older methods, OCTAVE and 
OCTAVE-S are still available and widely used. Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 below 
briefly expand on the three active OCTAVE methodologies.  
4.3.1 OCTAVE method 
Launched in 1999, the OCTAVE method was the original release of the OC-
TAVE methodologies developed for larger organisations with 300 or more em-
ployees (CERT 2013a). Although the method focuses on the requirements of 
larger organisations it is not the only consideration of the methodology. More 
specifically it was designed for organisations that: 
• Have a multi-layered hierarchical structure 
• Are responsible for maintaining their own computing infrastructure 
• Are familiar with and capable of operating vulnerability evaluation 
tools 
• Are familiar with and are capable of interpreting the results from vul-
nerability evaluations (SEI 2007, 2) 
The OCTAVE Method uses a three-phased approach to examine organisational 
and technological issues in order to assemble a comprehensive picture of the 
organisation’s information security needs (Alberts and Dorofee 2004, 44). The 
purpose of each phase is as follows: 
• Phase 1: Perform an organisational evaluation to determine the critical 
assets and the existing methods protecting them. Identify the security re-
quirements for each critical asset and build asset-based threat profiles. 
• Phase 2: Perform a technological evaluation to identify the infrastructure 
vulnerabilities that are related to and expose each critical asset.  
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• Phase 3: Perform a risk analysis to develop a security protection strategy 
and mitigation plans to address the identified risks. (Panda 2009, 4) 
Figure 10 illustrates how each phase of the OCTAVE method is broken down 
into eight sub-processes: four in phase 1, two in phase 2, and two in phase 3. 
These processes utilise knowledge from the various levels in the structure of 
the organisation to complete a systematic information security risk evaluation. 
 
Figure 10. The OCTAVE method three-phased approach (Panda 2009, 3). 
The three phases and associated sub-processes are supported by a series of 
data gathering workshops that involve the completion of surveys and risk 
measurement worksheets. These activities are essential to the whole risk as-
sessment in order to elicit and capture information during focused discussions 
and problem-solving sessions (CERT 2013a). 
Phase 2 
Technological View 
Phase 3 
Risk Analysis 
Process 1 
Process 2 
Process 4 
Process 6 
Process 3 
Process 5 Process 7 
Process 8 
Phase 1 
Organisational View 
Identify senior 
management 
knowledge. 
Identify operational 
area management 
knowledge. 
Identify staff 
knowledge. 
Create threat 
profile. 
Identify key com-
ponents. 
Evaluate selected 
components. 
Conduct risk 
analysis. 
Develop protection 
strategy and  
mitigation plan. 
Next  
Steps 
64 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
4.3.2 OCTAVE-S method  
The OCTAVE-S method is a variation of the original OCTAVE approach that 
was developed to meet the needs of smaller sized organisations of about 100 or 
less employees (CERT 2013b). OCTAVE-S was adapted to use a more stream-
lined process that is customised to the more limited means and particular con-
straints typically found in smaller organisations. This method focuses on organi-
sations that: 
• Have a flat or simple hierarchical structure with people from different 
organisational levels being accustomed to working with each other 
• Outsource most or all of their IT functions 
• Have a simple IT infrastructure that is well understood internally 
• Have limited familiarity with vulnerability evaluation tools 
• Have limited knowledge to sufficiently interpret the results from vul-
nerability evaluations or obtain external professional assistance (Al-
berts et al. 2004, 8). 
Although the appearance and structure of OCTAVE-S differs from the OCTAVE 
method, the technique meets the same underlying criteria and achieves similar 
results in providing a protection strategy suited to the organisation (Alberts et al. 
2004, 3). OCTAVE-S is similarly based on the three-phased approach de-
scribed in the OCTAVE method. However, the number and sequencing of the 
sub-processes have been condensed into just four (Figure 11): 
 
Figure 11. The OCTAVE-S method processes (Panda 2009, 4). 
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In order to perform the OCTAVE-S risk assessment a small interdisciplinary 
analysis team of three to five people is required. The team must have a broad 
understanding of the organisation’s business and security processes sufficient 
to execute all of the OCTAVE-S activities. The extent of the analysis team’s 
knowledge means that, unlike the OCTAVE method, OCTAVE-S discards the 
data gathering workshops held in the initial stages of the evaluation process in 
order to obtain information about crucial assets, security requirements, threats, 
and existing security practices (CERT 2013b). 
OCTAVE-S conducts a limited exploration of an organisation’s computing infra-
structure since small sized companies predominantly outsource their IT services 
and functions (CERT 2013b). In addition, small companies typically do not have 
the developed organisational capabilities to run or interpret the results of vul-
nerability evaluation tools. Instead of using vulnerability data to assess current 
security practices OCTAVE-S examines the existing processes employed to 
securely configure and maintain an organisation’s IT infrastructure (Alberts et al. 
2004, 5). 
4.3.3 OCTAVE Allegro method 
Published in 2007, the OCTAVE Allegro method is the SEI’s third and latest 
addition to their portfolio of risk assessments available for public use. Similar to 
the OCTAVE and OCTAVE-S methods, OCTAVE Allegro has been designed to 
perform a broad assessment of an organisation’s operational risk environment, 
but offers an alternative approach. The risk assessment is refined and improved 
to produce more robust results in a more efficient and effective manner and re-
quires less resources to achieve the result (SEI 2007, 4).  
One of the key drivers that led the SEI to formulate the OCTAVE Allegro meth-
odology was the need to refine the definition of the assessment scope and 
streamline the data collection and threat identification processes (SEI 2007, 4). 
Unlike previous OCTAVE versions, Allegro focuses primarily on information as-
sets and introduces the ‘container’ concept. Containers are used to describe the 
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places where information assets are stored, transported, and processed, and 
how each of these affects exposure to threats, vulnerabilities and disruptions 
(SEI 2007, 18). 
OCTAVE Allegro streamlines the risk assessment process by eliminating and/or 
simplifying many of the existing processes of the two earlier methodologies. The 
less involved approach is suitable for use by individuals who want to perform a 
more cost effective risk assessment without the need for engaging extensive 
organisational involvement, expertise or input. Similar to previous iterations the 
risk assessment can be performed in a ‘workshop-style’ collaborative setting 
supported with clear guidance, structured worksheet templates, and question-
naires. (SEI 2007, 4) 
The OCTAVE Allegro method comprises eight ‘process steps’ organised into 
four ‘phases’ (areas) of activity. The four phases are described in more detail 
below whilst the relationship between these and the eight process steps are 
illustrated in figure 12: 
 
Figure 12. The OCTAVE Allegro roadmap (Panda 2009, 5). 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 4 Step 6 
Establish risk 
management 
criteria. 
Develop  
information 
asset profile. 
Identify areas 
of concern. 
Identify risks. 
Identify  
information  
asset containers. 
Identify threat 
scenarios. 
Analyse risks. 
Select 
mitigation 
approach. 
Step 3 Step 5 Step 7 
Step 8 
Phase 4 
Identify & Mitigate Risks 
Phase 1 
Establish Drivers 
Phase 2 
Profile Assets 
Phase 3 
Identify Threats 
67 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
• Phase 1: Establish drivers – Participants develop risk measurement crite-
ria consistent with organisational drivers. I.e., the organisation’s mission 
statement, goal objectives and critical success factors. 
• Phase 2: Profile assets – Participants create a profile of each critical in-
formation asset. The process establishes clear boundaries for the asset, 
identifies its security requirements, and identifies all the locations where 
the asset is stored, transported, or processed.  
• Phase 3: Identify threats – Participants identify threats to each infor-
mation asset in the context of the locations where the asset is stored, 
transported, or processed. 
• Phase 4: Identify and mitigate risks – Participants identify and analyse 
risks to information assets and the development of mitigating actions. 
(Shostack 2014, 399) (Panda 2009, 4-5) 
4.4 NIST Special Publications 800 series (Computer Security) 
Established in the late 1980’s, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) is the U.S. federal technology agency that worked with industry to 
develop, apply and maintain technology, measurements, and standards. NIST 
organises its core activities across six laboratory units with their Information 
Technology Laboratory (ITL) managing the Computer Security Division (CSD). 
ITL are responsible for the development of NISTs special series of information 
security publications with the CSD providing tests, metrics, approval programs 
and standards to measure, validate and promote the security in information sys-
tems and services. (NIST 2013a) 
NISTs expanding ‘800 series’ of Special Publications (SP) have been specifical-
ly developed to outline the minimum information security requirements to im-
prove the efficiency and operation of federal information systems and offer 
guidance against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
information and supporting services. This series of publications have evolved 
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from ITLs extensive on-going proactive research in creating workable and cost-
effective methods to optimise the security of IT systems and networks.  
The concepts and principles contained in the SP 800 series are intended for 
federal agencies but are also suitable for use by small, medium or large public 
and private sector organisations (Landoll 2011, 83). NISTs SPs complement 
other international standards and guidelines used in the protection of infor-
mation security systems. NIST have established and mapped specific risk as-
sessment processes, approaches and guidelines that are similar to those de-
scribed in the ISO/IEC standards (NIST 2011, VII). These NIST mappings can 
assist organisations by providing evidence to efficiently ascertain if existing 
ISO/IEC security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended and 
satisfactorily meeting security requirements (Chabrow 2014). 
4.4.1 NIST Special Publication 800-30 – Conducting Risk Assessments 
NIST Special Publication 800-30 Rev. 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assess-
ments, provides comprehensive risk management guidance on the practice of 
conducting information security risk assessments within organisations. The pub-
lication describes risk assessments as a tool to “identify, prioritise, and estimate 
risk to organisational operations (including mission, functions, image, and repu-
tation), organisational assets, individuals, other organisations, and the nation(s), 
resulting from the operation and use of information systems” (NIST 2011, 1). 
Risk assessment is an intrinsic component of a holistic, organisation-wide risk 
management process. SP 800-30 focuses exclusively on the risk assessment 
component of risk management, which is one of four fundamental processes. 
This includes: (i) establishing the context for risk management activities that 
need to be executed – i.e. risk framing; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) responding to 
risk; and (iv) monitoring risk (NIST 2011, 4-5).  
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Figure 13 illustrates the steps in the risk management process including the risk 
assessment step. The information and communications flows are necessary to 
make the process work effectively. 
 
Figure 13. The four steps in the risk management process including the risk as-
sessment step (NIST 2011, 4). 
SP 800-30 provides practitioners with a feasible step-by-step process on the 
activities necessary to prepare for risk assessments, the activities necessary to 
conduct effective risk assessments and the activities necessary to ensure that 
risk assessments remain current over time (NIST 2011, 23). Each of the risk 
assessment process steps comprise a set of tasks that organisations must exe-
cute in order to successfully complete each process step. Figure 14 on the next 
page provides a pictorial overview of the basic steps required in the risk as-
sessment process and the tasks associated with the steps. 
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Figure 14. Risk assessment process (NIST 2011, 23). 
In addition to providing a comprehensive process for assessing information se-
curity risk the NIST publication describes how to apply the risk assessment pro-
cess across all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy. Tier 1 (the organi-
sation level), Tier 2 (the mission and business process level) and Tier 3 (the 
information system level) (NIST 2011, 1). More traditional risk assessment 
frameworks generally focus on Tier 3 (tactical level) whereas SP 800-30 broad-
ens the scope by taking into account other significant risk factors usually as-
sessed at the Tier 1 or Tier 2 strategic levels of the risk management hierarchy 
(NIST 2011, 17). 
To facilitate ease of use for individuals or groups conducting risk assessments 
this publication supports each stage of the assessment process with supple-
mentary guidance and information. Templates, tables and assessment scales 
for common risk factors are cross-referenced to more detailed information in the 
supporting appendices to provide maximum flexibility in designing risk assess-
ments. These are based on the purpose, scope, assumptions and constraints 
established by the federal agency or organisations (NIST 2011, 23). 
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The risk assessment approach described in SP 800-30 is supported by a series 
of related security standards and guidelines necessary for managing the infor-
mation security risk process (NIST 2011, 3). Table 5 lists the special publica-
tions that were developed to produce a unified information security framework 
suitable for federal agencies as well as public and private organisations: 
Table 5. NIST Special Publications security related standards (NIST 2011, 3). 
 
Published Standards 
 
Description of Standard  
NIST SP 800-39 
 
Managing Information Security Risk: Organisation, Mission, and 
Information System View 
NIST SP 800-37 
 
Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal 
Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach 
NIST SP 800-53 
 
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organisations 
NIST SP 800-53A 
 
Guide for Assessing Security Controls in Federal Information Sys-
tems & Organisations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans 
 
Special Publication 800-53 in particular supports the core risk assessment pro-
cesses by assisting with selection of baseline security controls or control en-
hancements. These controls are used to generally improve the existing security 
of an organisation’s information systems and to mitigate any risks identified in 
the SP 800-30 risk assessment. The objective is to adequately address and 
meet an organisation’s security risk management needs. 
4.4.2 NIST Special Publication 800-53 – Security and Privacy Controls 
Since its inception in 2005, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 4, Security 
and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organisations has 
provided federal agencies and organisations with a comprehensive catalogue of 
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baseline security and privacy controls necessary to support and strengthen their 
information systems and the environments in which those systems operate. The 
publication contains clear guidelines for selecting and specifying the appropriate 
controls to prevent breaches of IT security and potentially serious implications 
for the operations and assets of organisations as well as the welfare of individu-
als, other organisations and nation(s). The guidelines are applicable to all com-
ponents of an information system that process, store or transmit data (NIST 
2013b, 2). 
The baseline security controls and control enhancements in SP 800-53 address 
areas such as: mobile and cloud computing, applications security, trustworthi-
ness, assurance and resilience of information systems, insider threat, supply 
chain security and advanced persistent threat (NIST 2013b, XV). The extent of 
these safeguards and countermeasures provide federal agencies and organisa-
tions with the means to resist a range of IT security threats. For example, hos-
tile cyber attacks, natural disasters, accidents, structural failures, and human 
errors, both intentional and unintentional (NIST 2013b, 25). 
Although these baseline controls are well positioned to support most information 
security and privacy organisational processes some may require an element of 
customisation. SP 800-53 provides organisations with the flexibility to develop 
and tailor their particular applicable baseline security controls using a concept of 
overlays. These overlays provide a structured approach to help those organisa-
tions that need to tailor their security control baselines and develop specialised 
security plans. These can be aligned and applied to specific missions and busi-
ness functions with specific environments of operation and particular technolo-
gies (NIST 2013b, XV). The resulting set of customised security controls estab-
lishes a bespoke level of security suited to the organisation. 
4.5 ISO/IEC 27000 series – ISMS ‘family’ of international standards 
The ISO/IEC 27000-series of international standards are jointly developed, 
promoted and maintained by ISO and IEC for worldwide standardisation. This is 
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also known as the ‘ISMS family of standards’ or abbreviated to ‘ISO27K’ and is 
specifically dedicated to international management systems standards for in-
formation security. These standards are deliberately wide in scope so that they 
are applicable to organisations of all types and sizes and provide world-
renowned best practice with recommendations on information security man-
agement, risk assessments and controls within the context of the overall ISMS. 
(ISO 2014a) 
The ISO27K series allows organisations to develop and implement a framework 
for managing the security of their information assets. These assets may include 
financial information, intellectual property and employee details or information 
entrusted to them by customers or third parties (ISO 2014a). The ISO27K series 
can also be used as a tool to assist organisations with preparing and performing 
an ISRA of their own ISMS. 
The ISO27K series is formed from several major ISO/IEC operational interna-
tional standards under the general title ‘Information Technology – Security 
Techniques’. The common purpose of the series is to address the following four 
core areas that: 
a) Define requirements for an ISMS and for those certifying such systems; 
b) Provide direct support, detailed guidance and/or interpretation for the 
overall process to establish, implement, maintain and improve an ISMS; 
c) Address sector-specific guidelines for an ISMS; and 
d) Address conformity assessment for an ISMS. (ISO 2014a) 
There are currently fifteen different international standards that form the com-
plete ISO27K series which, when used together, specify the complete imple-
mentation of an ISMS. Table 6 on the following page lists all fifteen standards in 
numerical order. However, it is worth noting that at the time of writing this re-
search report not all standards were in circulation since some were still under 
final development. 
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Table 6. The ISO27K series of International Standards (ISO 2014a). 
 
 
Standard Code 
 
Brief description of Standard  
 
ISO/IEC 27000 
 
ISMS – Overview & vocabulary 
 
ISO/IEC 27001 
 
ISMS – Requirements 
 
ISO/IEC 27002 
 
Code of practice for information security controls 
 
ISO/IEC 27003 
 
ISMS – Implementation guidance 
 
ISO/IEC 27004 
 
Information security management – Measurement 
 
ISO/IEC 27005 
 
Information security risk management 
 
ISO/IEC 27006 
 
Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of infor-
mation security management systems 
 
ISO/IEC 27007 
 
Guidelines for information security management systems auditing 
 
ISO/IEC 27008 
 
Guidelines for auditors on information security controls 
 
ISO/IEC 27010 
 
Information security management for inter-sector and  
inter-organisational communications 
 
ISO/IEC 27011 
 
Information security management guidelines for telecommunications 
organisations 
 
ISO/IEC 27013 
 
Guidance on the integrated implementation of ISO/IEC 27001 
 
ISO/IEC 27014 
 
Governance and information security 
 
ISO/IEC 27015 
 
Information security management guidelines for financial services 
 
ISO/IEC 27016 
 
Information security management – Organisational economics 
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From the complete list of standards outlined in table 6 the focus of ISO/IEC 
27000 is to provide a general overview of the series together with a glossary of 
information security terms and of the standards concerned. The two core stand-
ards are (1) ISO/IEC 27001, which specifies the requirements for an ISMS and 
(2) ISO/IEC 27002, which establishes guidelines and principles to plan the im-
plementation of the ISMS.  
ISO/IEC standards 27003 to 27008 cover areas of the ISMS such as its final 
design, guidance for management approval, security metrics (measurement) 
and guidance for accredited certification bodies (auditors). It also describes the 
method of flow of the technical auditing process. The remaining standards in the 
series focus on the guidelines for sector specific implementation of information 
security management systems. 
Since the ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 standards form the core of the ISO27K 
series and the ISO/IEC 27005 standard focuses on the practical phases of in-
formation security implementation these are relevant to this research project. 
Each of these is discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections. 
4.5.1 ISO/IEC 27001 – ISMS requirements 
First published in 2005, the ISO/IEC 27001 International Standard specifies the 
requirements for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, 
maintaining and continually improving a documented information security man-
agement system in the context of the organisation’s overall business risks. In 
addition, the scope of the standard also includes over 130 generic controls for 
the assessment and treatment of information security risks tailored to the needs 
of an organisation. (ISO 2013d) 
The controls cover a range of detailed areas where information security could 
be compromised. These include: security policy, staffing issues, equipment is-
sues, access controls to both computing equipment and data, compliance with 
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legal requirements and standards, acquisition, development and maintenance 
of the system and management of business continuity. (Higgins 2013) 
ISO/IEC 27001 adopts a process approach for establishing, implementing, mon-
itoring, and maintaining an information security management system. These 
processes are achieved through the use of a "Plan-Do-Check-Act" (PDCA) 
model. The PDCA model encourages its users to follow a four-step process:  
a) PLAN – ‘Establish’ the ISMS policy, objectives, processes and proce-
dures relevant to managing risk and improving information security to de-
liver results in accordance with an organisation’s policies and objectives. 
b) DO – ‘Implement’ and operate the ISMS policy, controls, processes and 
procedures; 
c) CHECK – ‘Monitor’ and assess the effectiveness and process perfor-
mance against the ISMS policy, objectives and practical experience. 
d) ACT – ‘Maintain’ and continually improve the ISMS by taking corrective 
and preventative actions, based on the results of the internal ISMS audit. 
(ISO 2013d) 
The design and implementation of an ISMS is influenced by, and scaled in ac-
cordance with an organisation’s needs, objectives, security requirements, the 
processes employed and the size and structure of the organisation. Based on 
these influences, the standard is used by internal and external parties to assess 
the organisation’s ability to meet predefined information security requirements. 
In order to support consistent and integrated implementation and operation with 
other related international management standards ISO/IEC 27001 has been 
aligned with ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. (ISO 2013d) 
4.5.2 ISO/IEC 27002 – Code of practice for information security controls 
The ISO/IEC 27002 International Standard is designed for organisations to use 
as a reference for selecting information security controls within the process of 
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implementing an ISMS based on ISO/IEC 27001. It is also used as a guidance 
document for organisations implementing commonly accepted information secu-
rity controls including those essential for legislative compliance as well as those 
required for best practice (ISO 2013e) (Higgins 2013). 
The latest revision of ISO/IEC 27002 was published in 2013 and contains 114 
controls as opposed to the 133 documented in the previous 2005 version. For 
clarity these controls are presented in fourteen sections, rather than the original 
eleven. These controls and control objectives are intended to address specific 
requirements identified via a formal risk assessment. In addition the standard is 
intended to provide a guide for the development of organisational security 
standards and effective security management practices and help build confi-
dence in inter-organisational activities (ISO 2013e).  
ISO/IEC 27002 is regarded as a starting point for developing specific infor-
mation security guidelines for an organisation. Not all of the controls and guid-
ance in this standard may be applicable and so additional controls and guide-
lines may need to be carefully selected and adopted. ISO/IEC 27002 is fre-
quently cross-referenced within ISO/IEC 27001 as this is indispensible for its 
application. Therefore, both standards are complementary and intended for use 
together. 
4.5.3 ISO/IEC 27005 – Information security risk management 
ISO/IEC 27007 provides guidelines for information security risk management 
(ISRM) in an organisation. It supports the general concepts specified in ISO/IEC 
27001 and is designed to assist the satisfactory implementation of information 
security based on a risk management approach (ISO 2011). The standard does 
not provide or recommend a specific methodology for an ISRM since it is the 
responsibility of each organisation to define their own individual approach to risk 
management. For example, this might be dependent on the scope of the ISMS, 
the context of risk management or the industry sector.  
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ISO/IEC 27005 is applicable to any type and size of organisation which intends 
to manage risks that could compromise its information security. The standard is 
relevant to “managers and staff concerned with information security risk man-
agement within an organisation and where appropriate external parties support-
ing such activities” (ISO 2011). 
In order to ensure a complete understanding of the ISO/IEC 27005 standard it is 
essential that knowledge of the core concepts, models, processes and termi-
nologies described in ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 is first attained. 
4.6 Selecting a suitable ISRA framework for this research project 
At the start of this report it was clarified that the scope of the project had been 
reduced over the original project brief to rationalise resources and costs. These 
changes directly influenced the selection of the evaluated security risk assess-
ment methods and standards. It was important to select an information security 
risk assessment methodology that was relatively easy and quick to use, re-
quired minimum training and knowledge and involved the least amount of hu-
man resources. It would also need to produce reliable and consistent results, 
encourage development of the company’s ISMS and support both the current 
and future business environments. 
4.6.1 The chosen framework – OCTAVE Allegro method 
From the four best-practice options appraised in this chapter the OCTAVE se-
ries of security risk assessment frameworks was shortlisted for its overall suita-
bility to scale and type of the company being appraised in this research project. 
From the three different methods in the OCTAVE series the OCTAVE Allegro 
methodology was chosen to perform the company ISRA and to best assist with 
the completion of the research project objectives.  
OCTAVE Allegro simplifies many of the existing processes from the earlier OC-
TAVE and OCTAVE-S methodologies. The Allegro method has been designed 
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to perform a broad assessment of an organisation’s operational risk environ-
ment requiring less extensive examination of the information infrastructure yet 
will still produce reliable results in a more efficient and effective manner (SEI 
2007, 4). Selecting OCTAVE Allegro meets the key objective in obtaining the 
outputs required by the company with limited investment in time and resources. 
This particular method streamlines and optimises the process of assessing in-
formation security risks (SEI 2007, IX). These factors are also key to the suc-
cess of the research project with its restricted time frame for completion using 
the least possible investment resources. 
SEI (2007, 3) states that “OCTAVE Allegro is specifically designed for organisa-
tions of about 100 people or less” which is appropriate for the company’s thirty-
five strong workforce. Allegro is suitable for use by individuals wishing to per-
form a security risk assessment without extensive organisational involvement, 
expertise, or input (SEI 2007, 4). Allegro’s capabilities and methods also meet 
the requirements of this research project since the core areas of research were 
conducted by an individual employee of the company (the researcher) working 
with very limited support from a small internal group providing assistance with 
some of the preparatory phases only. It should also be noted that all personnel 
involved in the risk assessment process had relatively little expertise in the field 
of information security. 
With no rigorously documented company IT procedures in place, no industry 
standard ISRA framework in place, limited resources and lack of internal expe-
rience in performing an ISRA adopting OCTAVE Allegro’s lean assessment 
methodology would be beneficial to the company. The method provides: 
• Ease of use – The size and complexity of processes that must be under-
stood and applied to a risk assessment. The amount of data that must be 
collected and managed throughout the process is to be minimised. Guid-
ance, worksheets and examples provide a structured path when perform-
ing the risk assessment. 
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• Refined scope – Accurately defining the scope of a risk assessment im-
proves the results and requires less overall effort. OCTAVE Allegro fo-
cuses exclusively on the most important information assets to enable the 
organisation to define a manageable scope from the outset.  
• Reduced knowledge and training – By minimising the amount of risk 
management and IT knowledge required to perform an effective Allegro 
risk assessment the number of internal personnel needed to participate 
in the process is reduced. Consequently the cost associated with the 
training and mentoring is also reduced. 
• Reduced resource commitments – To optimise the use of resources the 
Allegro assessment reduces the required process activities to only those 
that are necessary. This ensures that those conducted are more mean-
ingful, require less data manipulation and are streamlined for identifying 
and mitigating risks. Documentation and the organisation of data are also 
improved through the efficient and effective design of Allegro worksheets 
that reduce the amount of data carried forward.   
• Consistent and comparable results – The Allegro methodology supports 
and enables a larger enterprise risk management effort by allowing the 
organisation to achieve not only consistent results over time but results 
that are generically comparable across all operating units and lines of 
business.  
• Facilitates a risk-aware culture – This is promoted by Allegro’s accessible 
risk assessment methodology with low barriers of use and no specialised 
training being needed. It encourages the production of meaningful results 
that can be understood throughout the organisation helping to cultivate 
risk management appreciation. This assists employees to better perform 
their job responsibilities in safeguarding the company security interests.  
• Supports compliance activities – The Allegro risk assessment methodol-
ogy supports other organisations allied to the company with their infor-
mation security risk management activities enabling them to act quickly 
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and achieve compliance with various laws and regulations efficiently. 
(SEI 2007, 8-10) 
4.7 Reasons for discarding other ISRA options 
The COBIT security risk assessment method, NIST SP 800 series of computer 
security guidance publications and the ISO/IEC 27000 family of international 
information security standards were not adopted for the purposes of completing 
this research project for the following reasons. 
The process orientation of COBIT involves a number of systematic procedures 
that require planning, implementation, execution and monitoring activities. How-
ever, the benefits of using COBIT rely heavily upon these activities, but due to 
the reduced project scope could not be carried out. COBIT does not always 
provide detailed explanations of specific procedures since the control objectives 
are more aligned with achieving outcomes (Mataracioglu and Ozkan 2011, 3).  
The NIST SP 800-30 guide for conducting risk assessments explores more tac-
tical and organisational issues. Is very detailed and rigid in structure and is 
more suited to third party execution by a professional body. This is quite the 
opposite of the OCTAVE method where there is much more flexibility to operate 
a self-directed internal team that makes use of existing knowledge within the 
organisation. NIST also tends to focus heavily on promoting information gather-
ing such as questionnaires, interviews and document reviews rather than a 
more practical workshop-based approach involving key personnel to gather in-
formation and make decisions. (Tewari 2013) 
The ISO/IEC 27001 standard requires several complex and resource intensive 
phases to define the scope of an organisation’s ISMS. With this level of com-
plexity demanded by ISO/IEC 27001 and supplementary standards from the 
ISO27k family, seeking professional guidance and support from external con-
sultants would need to be sought (Raywood 2010). A considerable amount of 
time and resources would be needed to produce the relevant company specific 
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information, security policies and procedures under the supervision of a con-
sultant, which would be a considerable expense for a smaller sized company. 
These overheads and the preparatory work required are not suited to this re-
search project. 
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5 PREPARATIONS AND PROCESSES FOR THE ISRA 
5.1 Preparation for the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment 
Prior to the commencement of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment two sup-
porting documents from the SEI were thoroughly reviewed by the company’s 
senior management, IT personnel and the researcher. The first document 
named ‘Introducing OCTAVE Allegro’ is a technical report highlighting the de-
sign considerations, requirements and preparatory work needed for an OC-
TAVE Allegro risk assessment. The second document named the ‘OCTAVE 
Allegro Guidebook’ provides guidance, worksheets and examples used to sup-
port the completion of the practical steps of the risk assessment. 
For the purposes of this research project the information and guidance from the 
two SEI documents provided a reference point throughout the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk assessment process. The documents also outlined the necessity to com-
plete a certain level of preparatory work before beginning the company specific 
risk assessment. Some of the preparatory activities included obtaining man-
agement support, allocating appropriate organisational resources to the pro-
cesses and scoping the numerous risk assessment steps (SEI 2007, 23). The 
activities were addressed during several internal initiation meetings involving 
senior management, IT personnel and the researcher. The topics and outcomes 
from the meetings are discussed below. 
5.1.1 Organisational resource commitment 
Obtaining full sponsorship from the company’s senior management was a criti-
cal factor in successfully performing the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment. 
From the initial preparatory stages of this research project it was ensured that 
senior management were fully committed and available when necessary to pro-
vide active support to the risk assessment process. Although the OCTAVE Alle-
gro methodology promotes a streamlined assessment that can minimise the 
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participation of busy senior management, their input was still essential in the 
development of the organisation-wide risk measurement criteria. 
During the inaugural meetings with senior management discussions were fo-
cused on the rationalisation of human resources that were to be made available 
for the completion of this research project. In an effort to free up specific re-
sources it was agreed that sufficient and suitably skilled company personnel 
would be allocated to the different in-house assessment processes. This sup-
port enabled the members of the assessment team to devote the necessary 
time required to perform a more complete and thorough process. This promoted 
a greater chance of developing useful results towards improving the company’s 
overall level of information systems security. 
5.1.2 Allocation of organisational resources 
Two important aspects of the OCTAVE Allegro method are the size and compo-
sition of the assessment team. Guidance from the supporting documentation 
specifically states that the level of a company’s expertise and the perceived in-
volvement of different departments in the assessment process determine the 
size and capability of the assessment team. This can be from as little as one 
person to as many as seven. (SEI 2007, 23) 
Taking the SEI’s guidance into consideration those company personnel having 
the relevant skillsets to assist with the risk assessment process were shortlist-
ed. An importance was placed on candidates who had the knowledge and ex-
perience working within operational areas of the business where the risk as-
sessment would be focused. Based on the diversity and capacity of the compa-
ny’s resource pool it was concluded that four personnel from across four differ-
ent departments were to be selected to form the OCTAVE Allegro risk assess-
ment team. Information about the chosen candidates and the departments they 
work in are briefly outlined in table 7 on the next page. 
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Table 7. A list of the company personnel involved in the OCTAVE Allegro risk 
assessment process including their working roles. 
Position / Department Role of the Department 
Technical Director 
(Project Management) 
Responsible for incoming and outgoing quotations involv-
ing the handling of sensitive project related data entered 
into the company’s internal database system. 
Administration Manager 
(Administration Department) 
Responsible for sending and receiving invoices and paying 
employees’ salaries, which includes access to employee 
and project related sensitive electronic data stored on the 
company’s internal server. 
Production Manager 
(Production Department) 
Responsible for managing the manufacturing phases of all 
active projects, which includes the handling of sensitive 
data printed from electronic files stored on the company’s 
internal server.  
IT Administrator and personnel 
(IT Department) 
Responsible for installing and maintaining all IT related 
systems and ensuring the security and integrity of all elec-
tronic data stored on the company’s internal server. 
 
Access to the company IT department and knowledge from the IT personnel 
and the researcher were priority resources during the assessment steps. These 
steps involved the mapping of information assets, the development of threat 
scenarios and risk mitigation plans. The IT personnel were needed to provide 
the technical in-depth knowledge that other members of the assessment team 
lacked. 
5.1.3 Training and timescale requirements 
Although the OCTAVE Allegro methodology has been designed for ease of ap-
plication previous working knowledge and experience in any of the different 
OCTAVE risk assessments would be beneficial. This would enable an organisa-
tion to quickly become familiar with the guidance, worksheets and question-
naires associated with the OCTAVE Allegro method. Organisations totally new 
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to the OCTAVE process are generally advised to set aside ample time to review 
the steps involved and perform basic ‘starter workshops’ to support the as-
sessment team members. The SEI claim that by spending just one or two days 
following the guidance and self-explanatory worksheets included in the support-
ing documentation, an assessment team can become fully functional and ready 
to deploy the components of the Allegro method without significant delay or 
challenge (SEI 2007, 24).  
Prior to starting the OCTAVE Allegro assessment the company decided to per-
form six separate three-hour starter workshop sessions spread across a one-
month time period. The sessions were used to introduce the OCTAVE Allegro 
process to all team members to achieve a common base knowledge level be-
fore formally commencing the assessment programme. 
When performing the practical element of the OCTAVE assessment the time 
commitment required from the organisational resources proved difficult to pre-
dict. This was not only dependent on the availability, experience and make-up 
of the assessment team, but also on other influential factors such as the com-
plexity of a company information asset, the complexity of the environment in 
which the asset was stored, transported or processed, and the number of infor-
mation assets that were reviewed. Due to the limited time and resources as-
signed to this research project it was decided that the number of information 
assets reviewed in the risk assessment would be minimised. 
5.2 Performing the practical steps of the OCTAVE Allegro assessment 
The practical steps of the OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment process were com-
pleted in different activity phases over a five-week period using the allocated 
organisational resources outlined in table 7. Eight practical steps split into four 
phases were performed in a workshop-style collaborative setting in accordance 
with the SEI’s guidance and worksheets. The relationship between the activity 
phases and steps of the methodology were previously illustrated in the OC-
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TAVE Allegro roadmap in figure 12. A breakdown of how each of the phases 
and steps were completed over the five-week time period is defined in table 8. 
Table 8. A breakdown of the OCTAVE Allegro phases and steps completed 
over the five-week time period. 
Week number / Phase Step number / Purpose 
 
WEEK 1: 
ESTABLISH DRIVERS 
STEP 1 – Establish risk measurement criteria 
WEEK 2: 
PROFILE ASSETS 
STEP 2 – Develop information asset profile 
STEP 3 – Identify information asset containers 
WEEK 3: 
IDENTIFY THREATS 
STEP 4 – Identify areas of concern 
STEP 5 – Identify threat scenarios. 
WEEK 4+5: 
IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISKS 
STEP 6 – Identify risks 
STEP 7 – Analyse risks 
STEP 8 – Select mitigation approach 
 
The outputs from each step in the process were captured in a series of work-
sheets with the output of one step being used as the input into the next step of 
the process. The individual steps of the methodology are described in more de-
tail below with the completed worksheets listed in the appendices. 
5.2.1 Step 1 – Establishing risk measurement criteria 
During the first step of the assessment process the team established the organ-
isational drivers that were used to evaluate the effects of a risk to the compa-
ny’s mission and business objectives. Risk measurement criteria are essentially 
a set of qualitative measures against which the effects of a realised risk can be 
evaluated and form the foundation of an information asset risk assessment (SEI 
2007, 17). It was important to use consistent risk measurement criteria that ac-
curately reflected the company’s view since it ensured that decisions about how 
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to mitigate any identified risks would be consistent across the many and various 
information assets involving different departments. 
To facilitate this first step the standardised set of blank OCTAVE Allegro work-
sheet templates were completed to create the relevant risk measurement crite-
ria in several impact areas and then to prioritise them. During the process the 
assessment team identified high, medium, and low risk impacts within each of 
the following impact area categories: 
• Worksheet 1 – Reputation and customer confidence 
• Worksheet 2 – Financial 
• Worksheet 3 – Productivity 
• Worksheet 4 – Health and safety 
• Worksheet 5 – Fines and legal penalties 
• Worksheet 6 – ‘User-defined’ 
The five standardised impact area categories and the impact areas listed within 
each were common to most of the company’s mission and business objectives. 
However, there were still company specific impact areas of importance that 
were missing. To enable customisation of the worksheets each worksheet con-
tained an option entitled ‘other’ to supplement the standard impact areas with 
additional categories that were more meaningful to a company. A sixth work-
sheet was also provided which focused on a ‘user-defined’ impact area catego-
ry along with standard impact areas. Due to the necessity for the company to 
outsource smaller project-related manufacturing and processing tasks to third 
parties it was concluded that the sixth worksheet would be used and custom-
ised to focus on the impact area category involving ‘customer responsibility’. 
Once the assessment team had populated the relevant company information 
into the predefined and user-defined impact areas across the six worksheets a 
seventh worksheet entitled ‘impact area prioritisation’ was used in calculating 
the relative risk scores. The process resulted in the prioritisation of the impact 
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area categories with the most important category receiving the highest score of 
(6) and the least important category receiving the lowest score of (1). All six of 
the completed impact area category worksheets and the seventh impact area 
prioritisation rankings are available in appendices one to seven of this report.  
5.2.2 Step 2 – Developing an information asset profile 
The primary focus of an OCTAVE Allegro assessment is on the information as-
sets of a company. In the second step the team began the process of identify-
ing the company’s information assets on which the assessment was later per-
formed. Using the SEI’s guidance the following questions were considered 
when identifying the company’s critical information assets: 
• What information assets are the most valuable to the company? 
• What information assets are used in the day-to-day work processes and 
operations within the company? 
• What information assets, if lost, would significantly disrupt the company’s 
ability to accomplish its goals and contribute to achieving its mission? 
• What other assets are closely related to these assets? (SEI 2007, 35) 
Once the critical information assets were identified a ‘profile’ was created for 
each, which formed the basis for the identification of threats and risks in the 
subsequent steps. The profile is a representation of an information asset de-
scribing its unique features, qualities, characteristics and value. The profiling 
process ensured that the boundaries of an identified asset were clearly de-
scribed and that the security requirements for the asset were also adequately 
defined (SEI 2007, 18-35). The profile for each company asset was captured on 
a single worksheet. The completed worksheets are available in appendix eight. 
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5.2.3 Step 3 – Identifying information asset containers 
Step three of the process involved the identification of the company’s infor-
mation asset containers. An information asset container describes the places 
where information assets are stored, transported, or processed and is a place 
where an information asset ‘resides’. Containers are most typically identified as 
some form of information asset such as hardware, software, application sys-
tems, servers and networks. However, a container can also include items such 
as files and folders where information is stored in written form as well as any 
person authorised to carry around intellectual property or information that is 
sensitive or confidential. The person who possesses such key organisational 
information is essentially classed as a ‘container’ and must be considered when 
profiling risks to that particular information asset. 
During the risk assessment the identification of information asset containers 
was essential to identifying the risks to the information asset itself. By mapping 
an information asset to all of the containers in which it ‘resides’ the process de-
fines the boundaries of the technical environment and infrastructure that were 
then examined for risk. Any risk to the containers in which an information asset 
resides are inherited by that particular information asset. During the container 
identification process it was recognised that some of the information assets not 
only reside within containers in the company’s boundaries but also reside in 
containers that were not under the direct control of the company. 
Worksheet 9a was used to identify and record the containers that were under 
direct internal control of the company and those that were managed outside of 
the company. Worksheet 9b was used to identify the physical locations where 
the information assets existed either inside or outside of the company. Work-
sheet 9c was used to identify people that were internal or external to the com-
pany with detailed knowledge of the information asset. The assessment team 
and other influential personnel were used to develop an accurate map of all the 
places where the company’s information assets were stored, transported or 
processed. Appendix nine lists the results of these activities. 
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5.2.4 Step 4 – Identifying areas of concern 
Step four involved the development of information asset risk profiles for the 
company’s information assets. Here the assessment team began to address the 
threat component of the risk identification process by brainstorming the possible 
conditions or situations that could threaten a company information asset. These 
scenarios are referred to as ‘areas of concern’ and may represent threats and 
corresponding undesirable outcomes. By identifying areas of concern any threat 
that is unique to the company and its operating conditions could be quickly es-
tablished.  
The purpose of this step was not to focus on capturing a complete list of all 
possible threat scenarios related to an information asset, but to quickly capture 
and record obvious situations or conditions. This step was performed by the 
assessment team who considered the various actors, motives and outcomes 
inherent in the area of concern whilst keeping in mind the security requirements 
for the particular information assets. This included agreeing how these assets 
might be compromised due to a threat in a ‘real-world’ scenario. The areas of 
concern were then captured and recorded on the information asset risk Work-
sheet ten with the details used to feed into the development of risk profiles in 
step five. The completed Worksheets can be viewed in the appendices. 
5.2.5 Step 5 – Identifying threat scenarios 
In the fifth step of the process the documented areas of concern captured in the 
preceding step were expanded into threat scenarios that further detailed the 
properties of the identified threats. In order to expand the areas of concern 
more accurately, four different categories of threat ‘tree’ models were used from 
the SEI’s supporting documentation (SEI 2007, 49-50). Each threat tree struc-
ture visually represents a range of threat scenarios to help the assessment 
team consider a range of potential threats to the company’s information assets 
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when determining risk. A description of the four different threat tree categories 
is described in table 9. 
Table 9. Description of the four OCTAVE Allegro threat tree categories (SEI 
2007, 19). 
Threat Tree category Definition of category 
 
Human actors using  
technical means 
The threats in this category represent threats to an information as-
set via a company’s technical infrastructure or by direct access to a 
container (technical asset) that hosts the asset. They require direct 
action by a person and can be deliberate or accidental in nature. 
Human actors using  
physical means 
The threats in this category represent threats to an information as-
set that result from physical access to the asset or container that 
hosts the information asset. They require direct action by a person 
and can be deliberate or accidental in nature. 
Technical problems 
The threats in this category represent problems with a company’s IT 
and systems such as software and hardware defects, malicious 
code (e.g., viruses), and other system-related problems. 
Other problems 
The threats in this category are problems or situations that are out-
side the control of the company. Examples include natural disasters 
(e.g., floods, earthquakes) and interdependency, which include 
critical infrastructures not being available (e.g., power supply). 
 
The threat scenarios derived from the areas of concern correspond to a branch 
of a threat tree. To ensure a more robust consideration of the threats, each 
branch of the threat tree was considered for each information asset. The infor-
mation asset environment maps (Worksheets 9a, 9b and 9c) created in step 
four were used to assist with the process. 
5.2.6 Step 6 – Identifying risks 
With the threat scenarios identified in step five, the sixth step focused on the 
consequences for the company should a threat be realised. The assessment 
team analysed each of the threat scenarios recorded on the information asset 
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risk worksheets to determine how the company would be impacted. A minimum 
of one consequence was documented with others added as necessary. It was 
important for the team to understand that a threat can potentially have multiple 
impacts on the company. For example, it might affect both the reputation and 
the financial position of the company. By identifying how the company would be 
impacted the risk equation was completed, which can be illustrated as follows: 
Threat (condition) + Impact (consequence) = Risk 
[Steps 4 and 5] + [Step 6] = Risk 
A risk is the probability of the company suffering harm or loss from a person 
doing something undesirable or a natural occurrence causing an undesirable 
outcome resulting in a negative impact or occurrence. A risk is composed of 
three elements: an event, a consequence and uncertainty. (SEI 2007, 53) 
5.2.7 Step 7 – Analysing risks 
For the seventh step of the Allegro process the assessment team qualitatively 
measured the extent to which the company would be impacted by a threat. This 
was achieved by calculating a risk score for each risk to each information asset. 
The scoring information was then used to assist the team with determining 
which tasks needed to be mitigated immediately and for prioritising mitigation 
actions for the remaining risks that were tackled in final eighth step. 
Through the guidelines and examples provided in the SEI’s documentation the 
team followed a set of calculation methods to generate a relative risk score for 
each information asset. The relative risk scores were obtained by considering 
the extent to which the different consequences of risks recorded in Worksheets 
ten affected the company compared with the relative importance of the high, 
medium and low impact areas in Worksheets 8. For example, if reputation was 
of particular importance to the company and the consequence of a risk would 
cause significant damage to the company’s reputation then action must be tak-
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en to ensure the risk is mitigated. By using these criteria the assessment team 
ensured that the risks were scored in the context of the organisational drivers. 
This step in particular required the team to combine their own company 
knowledge with common sense. The SEI guidance states that the different risk 
scores generated are only to be used as a prioritisation tool and that differences 
between risk scores are not considered to be of significance. For example, a 
risk score of 40 would mean that the risk is relatively more important to the 
company than a score of 25, but there is no importance placed on the difference 
in the 15 points. The different risk score outcomes can be viewed between ap-
pendices ten to fourteen.  
5.2.8 Step 8 – Selecting a mitigation approach 
In the eighth and final step of the OCTAVE Allegro assessment process the 
team determined which of the identified risks from step seven would be mitigat-
ed and how. This was achieved by first prioritising the risks based on their rela-
tive risk score from step seven and then deciding on an approach to mitigate 
the most important risks based on a number of organisational factors.  
The company’s decision to accept a risk, mitigate it or defer it was based on a 
number of important and influential factors. Although the impact value of a risk 
was a primary driver so was the probability of its occurrence. For example, a 
risk that could seriously or significantly impact the company but was highly un-
likely to occur was ranked highly for priority mitigation. Since the impact and risk 
of a threat is specific to the company the assessment guidelines alone do not 
provide a decisive path regarding which risks to mitigate. This was a decision 
that had to be driven by the individual team members involved in the risk as-
sessment together with their knowledge of the company. 
SEI’s guidance documentation assisted in sensibly categorising the risks. Once 
the risks had been prioritised and a decision made to mitigate one or more of 
them, a mitigation strategy was developed by the team. This considered the 
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value of the assets, the places where they reside and the company’s unique 
operating environment. The decision to mitigate a risk was a complex endeav-
our that required discussion with the necessary relevant skilled personnel within 
the company. Throughout the process it was important to have the support of 
the senior management and to collaborate with the IT department and other 
stakeholders to develop balanced and cost-effective mitigation strategies that 
provided the best overall long-term protection for the company. 
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6 PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE ISRA 
The content featured in this chapter will not be published since it discusses in-
formation which is confidential and under a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
7 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR MITIGATING RISKS 
The content featured in this chapter will not be published since it discusses in-
formation which is confidential and under a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). 
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8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 Strategy and timeline for implementing the risk mitigation proposals 
The previous chapter outlined the proposed risk mitigation policies and practical 
procedures that will need to be implemented throughout the five identified areas 
of concern also known as ‘threat areas’. The principal of each risk mitigation 
proposal was researched and then discussed during several action-plan meet-
ings held between senior management, IT personnel and the researcher. Fur-
ther iterations were then made between the board of directors and senior man-
agement, which concluded with approval to proceed with more detailed re-
search and development for each risk mitigation approach. The completion of 
more detailed research will promote the development of the best possible miti-
gation methods to ensure that financial and human resources are carefully con-
sidered for the optimum solution. 
Table 10 featured in chapter seven lists the five threat areas that could poten-
tially lead to the greatest risk and impact on company operations. The probabil-
ity of these risks occurring and the severity of the associated impact have been 
calculated in each case. Under normal circumstances a complete company-
wide OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment could take considerably more time 
(months) and resources to implement fully. This would likely identify many more 
areas of concern of the order of maybe ten times than has been the case for 
this limited risk assessment. Because of the restricted scope of this research 
project the number of risks to be scored, prioritised and mitigated were far few-
er. Based on the relative risk scores assigned to the five threat areas the order 
of prioritisation to mitigate each of them would be as follows: 
1) VPN connections – Risk score 57 
2) Off-site backups stored to USB hard disk – Risk score 52  
Email Encryption – Risk score 52 
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3) Unlocked PC workstations – Risk score 45 
4) Control of printed technical documentation – Risk score 43 
Although the relative risk scores created from an OCTAVE Allegro assessment 
should primarily be used to define the order of risk mitigation, there are other 
factors, which can effect prioritisation. For example, the immediate availability of 
appropriately skilled personnel within the company assigned to research and 
test more secure software systems. The availability of finance to immediately 
purchase and implement the necessary company-wide training for these system 
upgrades would also influence prioritisation. 
Further iterations between senior management, IT personnel and the research-
er concluded that the less complex and less resource intensive risks that pose 
the least amount of disruption to the company’s workflow would be mitigated 
first. In order to differentiate the complexity of tasks each of the five threat areas 
were broken down into smaller ‘sub-tasks’. An estimate of the human resources 
and costs required to complete each sub-task was made taking account of the 
disruption to the company’s daily operations and of any training required to 
support the mitigation activity. At the time of writing this report a completed ‘ac-
tion plan’ was still being adjusted to finalise a comprehensive mitigation strate-
gy. This strategy was not available for inclusion in this report and the timeline 
for the tasks and sub-tasks will not be discussed in any further detail. 
8.2 Recommendation 1 – Further OCTAVE Allegro risk assessments 
Only one critical company information asset was reviewed in the OCTAVE Alle-
gro risk assessment due to the limited time and resources assigned to this re-
search project. The investigation of other critical information assets will require 
a similar assessment process to be conducted. However, these future assess-
ments would be subject to senior management’s approval and the availability of 
resources. The operational environment of the company is continually evolving 
and because the OCTAVE Allegro assessment is essentially a ‘snapshot’ of the 
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‘health’ of the IT security it can quickly become out-dated. An OCTAVE Allegro 
assessment will therefore need to be repeated every time there is a significant 
change in an information asset’s risk environment. 
One option is for the company’s IT personnel to schedule all smaller assess-
ments to ensure that changes in the risk environment are tracked at regular in-
tervals ensuring that they receive the proper attention required. However, there 
is concern that if significant changes to the company’s operational environment 
are implemented between these regular scheduled assessments then new risks 
might be introduced without being mitigated. Another approach would be for the 
company to perform a new assessment whenever there is a significant change 
to an information asset or its environment. This approach is more suited to 
regularly changing environments. The company needs to determine criteria for 
repeating the OCTAVE Allegro assessment and implementing and adopting this 
as company practice and policy. (SEI 2007, 25) 
8.3 Recommendation 2 – IT security penetration testing 
Ensuring the long-term security of the company’s IT systems and critical infor-
mation assets will involve more than just the completion of a single OCTAVE 
Allegro risk assessment. Further ongoing action will be required to supplement 
the improved ‘patch’ management, firewall protection, anti-virus software and 
other protective measures discussed in chapter seven. The long-term infor-
mation security improvement process will require frequent ‘real-world’ validation 
to confirm which software and systems are reliably effective and those that are 
prone to failure. One of the most effective ways to identify weaknesses and de-
ficiencies in any of the company’s programs and systems is to perform IT secu-
rity penetration testing.  
A penetration test, also known as ‘ethical hacking’ and ‘white-hat hacking’, is an 
authorised attempt to defeat the security protection of an IT system by safely 
attempting to exploit system vulnerabilities, including any OS, service and appli-
cation flaws, improper configurations and/or end-user behaviour (Landoll 2010, 
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15). A penetration test enables a company to assess its own ability to protect its 
IT network(s), applications, endpoints and users from external or internal at-
tempts to breach its security controls and gain unauthorised or privileged ac-
cess to protected critical information assets. (Coresecurity 2015)  
With the completion of the company’s first ever ISRA in line with the OCTAVE 
Allegro industry standard framework the risks identified during the process will 
be mitigated by implementing the necessary software, hardware and infor-
mation security policy improvements described at the start of this chapter. Once 
these necessary changes are implemented it is recommended that a penetra-
tion test is performed to provide senior management with further evidence to 
reassure that the risk mitigation measures introduced are fully effective and that 
the financial and human resource investments were justified.  
The penetration test process will enable the company’s authorised IT personnel 
to rigorously simulate the methods that a potential attacker might use to circum-
vent security controls, bypass security mechanisms and gain access to the 
company’s critical information systems. Software such as ‘Metasploit’ by Rapid7 
can be freely downloaded and used to perform reliable penetration tests to iden-
tify security issues and verify that any risk mitigation measures taken have been 
effective. The Metasploit framework is the world’s most used open source plat-
form, which encompasses contemporary hacking tools and techniques to con-
firm that existing information security controls provide effective protection. The 
framework also provides a consistent, reliable library of constantly updated ac-
tions for automating every aspect of a penetration test (Engebretson 2011, XIV). 
Part of the process includes probing for vulnerabilities as well as providing 
‘proof of concept’ attacks to demonstrate that these vulnerabilities are real. 
(Kennedy et al. 2011, 1-6) 
Once complete the results of a penetration test will identify possible ways in 
which an attacker might be able to compromise the company’s security controls 
to exploit the critical information systems and potentially damage the company. 
In many cases the data obtained from a successful penetration test will often 
uncover issues that an architecture review or vulnerability assessment would 
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not have been able to identify. A properly executed penetration test will result in 
specific recommendations for addressing and fixing issues identified during the 
test. These can then be used to help further develop, improve and secure the 
necessary hardware and software systems against future attack. (Kennedy et 
al. 2011, 1-6) 
By embracing frequent and comprehensive penetration testing the company will 
be more effective in countering any emerging security risks and preventing un-
authorised access to critical systems and valuable information. Penetration test-
ing will enable the company to meet its objectives by intelligently managing se-
curity vulnerabilities, avoiding the cost of network and system down time when 
recovering from a security breach, meeting regulatory requirements, avoiding 
fines and preserving their corporate reputation and customer loyalty. 
8.4 Recommendation 3 – Information security awareness and training 
It is a common misjudgement by companies, similar to the one in this research 
project, not to invest financial and human resources in securing their information 
technology software and hardware assets. Equally, little if any investment is 
made in ensuring that their employees are educated in the importance of these 
security measures. As a result, it is often the people and not the technology that 
are responsible for compromising the information security chain. It is essential 
that the company complement the reinforced technical information security con-
trols with an ongoing programme of information security awareness, training 
and educational activities for their employees to avoid human vulnerabilities 
undermining these technical advances. 
Similar to health and safety or any form of legal compliance, it is unrealistic for 
senior management to simply expect employees to comply with company infor-
mation security policies, adopt security standards and follow security proce-
dures if they are not fully informed of their personal responsibilities as part of an 
organisation. Information security awareness is therefore an essential element 
of an effective information security management system supporting and en-
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hancing the technical and procedural information security controls and contrib-
uting to a company’s overall IT governance framework. (Hinson 2009, 1-7) 
Information security awareness can be loosely defined as the extent to which 
personnel within a company fully understand the importance of information se-
curity, the level of security required by that organisation and their individual se-
curity responsibilities (ISF 2007, 92). In order to establish a genuine security 
culture throughout any company, awareness will need to go well beyond simply 
informing the employees of their security obligations. To overcome the inevita-
ble resistance to change employees will have to be both informed and motivat-
ed to modify their behaviour in order to think security and act more securely. 
(Herold 2013) 
The most effective way to secure the ‘human element’ in the security chain will 
be to implement a company-wide high-impact information security awareness 
training program that goes beyond just compliance of changing the long-term 
outlook of the company on this critical subject matter. Although the company’s 
IT personnel are competent in information security awareness the security train-
ing programme would best be delivered by a skilled professional training organ-
isation. However, the training programme will need to incorporate knowledge 
specific to the members of the IT department who will be able to assist with this.  
Company personnel will be taught the key elements of information security, why 
it is needed, their personal mandatory responsibilities and why a vigilant attitude 
will provide a safer more efficient working environment. The training will also 
ensure that role-based, security-related training is undertaken before personnel 
will be granted renewed authorisation to access the information systems after 
the security updates and improvements have been implemented. Regular secu-
rity-related refresher training will need to be planned in accordance with the 
company-defined frequency. A carefully monitored information security aware-
ness training programme will help ensure that company employees have a solid 
understanding of the company security policy, procedures and best practices in 
place. 
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8.5 Recommendation 4 – Improved IT management roles and responsibilities 
The completion of the ISRA not only uncovered several critical risk areas to be 
mitigated, but also highlighted the necessity for a more knowledgeable and re-
structured IT department. The previous sub-section 8.4 outlined the proposals 
for the implementation of a company-wide information security awareness-
training programme to address the identified knowledge shortfall. Training 
would increase in-depth understanding of the company policies, procedures and 
introduce other industry standard best practices.  
However, the structure of the company’s IT department lacks a designated per-
son who would take on the role and responsibility of establishing and enforcing 
information security policies that protect the company’s IT infrastructure, net-
works and data (Linton 2015). This responsibility would usually fall to an infor-
mation system security officer (ISSO). 
An information system security officer is given the responsibility for ensuring 
that a company’s operational security is appropriately maintained for an infor-
mation system. The officer works in close collaboration with the information sys-
tem owner such as the IT Administrator and serves as a principal advisor on all 
matters technical and otherwise involving the security of an information system. 
The officer must have the relevant detailed knowledge and expertise required to 
manage all security aspects of an information system. He/she is assigned re-
sponsibility for security operations of a system ensuring that the security of 
company personnel, handling of security incidents and organising information 
security awareness training are carried out. (Linton 2015) (NIST 2010b, 70) 
It is recommended that the company appoint a suitable candidate to undertake 
the role of an information security officer. Due to the relatively small size of the 
company and the limited resources it will be more cost effective to train an exist-
ing capable employee to a reasonable level of competency. The person who will 
be working within the boundaries of the company would be called upon to assist 
in the development of and compliance with security policies and procedures. 
The appointee would actively participate in the monitoring of the company’s IT 
129 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
systems and their environment of operation to assist in developing and updating 
the security plan, managing and controlling changes to the system and as-
sessing the impact on security of those changes (NIST 2010b, 70). 
130 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Gavin Doherty 
9 PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY 
9.1 Achieving the research objectives 
Chapter two of this report outlined four main research objectives forming the 
scope for this research project. The chosen project objectives were specific, 
measurable (ISRA assessment), achievable, realistic and timely to ensure that 
the research problem was explored effectively. The clearly defined project ob-
jectives enabled the research team to focus on the research problem, avoid the 
collection of unnecessary data, provide a clear direction to the research study 
and contribute a practical and theoretically sound framework of proposals to 
improve the company’s IT systems security.  
Achieving the four objectives proved to be a demanding task given the limited 
time constraints and reduced human and financial resources decided by senior 
management. The research, selection and then execution of the company spe-
cific ISRA required considerable effort in coordinating the personnel involved. 
Careful planning and professional guidance in the supporting ISRA documenta-
tion meant that this research project was able to fulfil the requirements of all 
four objectives. A brief summary of how each objective was achieved is dis-
cussed in the following sub-sections below. 
9.2 Objective 1 – Identifying the company’s information security risk status 
Prior to the start of this project, the first of the four research objectives involved 
an extensive company-wide preliminary investigation by the research team to 
identify, present and then discuss the status of the existing information security. 
The information gathered during these initial investigations concluded that the 
company’s existing mechanisms for maintaining a secure IT system environ-
ment were relatively primitive and troubled with inconsistencies. There were no 
rigorous policies, procedures or industry standard framework for conducting on-
demand information security risk assessments in place. 
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Further investigations were carried out to understand the international stand-
ards, binding contractual obligations and customer specific requirements ad-
hered to by the company. The results identified that ISO 9001:2008, AS9100, 
Nadcap and Boeing QMS international standards and special requirements de-
mand that to some extent these are all dependent on the company’s internal IT 
environment to execute the defined tasks. Although some developments had 
been made to the company’s IT systems security in order to meet standards 
and requirements, it became clear that the overall level of the systems security 
did not align with the highly onerous stipulations for the specialist precision en-
gineering work in the aerospace and defence industries. 
9.3 Objective 2 – Selecting an appropriate industry standard ISRA framework 
Taking into consideration the influential criteria and interaction within the com-
pany’s IT environment the second objective was to select an appropriate indus-
try standard information security risk assessment (ISRA) framework for devel-
oping improved information system security controls. A cross-section of viable 
ISRA frameworks was investigated and rationalised to shortlist four globally re-
spected ‘best-practice’ options. These were the ‘COBIT’ and ‘OCTAVE’ security 
risk assessment methods, the ‘NIST SP 800’ series of computer security guid-
ance publications and the ‘ISO/IEC 27000’ family of international information 
security standards. 
With no rigorously documented policies and/or procedures in place, limited re-
sources and lack of internal experience in performing an ISRA the OCTAVE 
Allegro lean assessment methodology was deemed to be the most beneficial of 
the four options. The OCTAVE Allegro method is user-friendly and contains a 
refined risk assessment scope. It only requires a limited level of knowledge and 
training to understand the processes involved and therefore fewer resource 
commitments were needed. In addition the output of consistent and comparable 
results facilitated a risk-aware culture and supported the company’s business 
compliance activities.  
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The OCTAVE Allegro method is particularly suited for use for performing a se-
curity risk assessment without extensive organisational involvement, expertise, 
or input. Therefore, this particular lean method of performing a usually complex 
ISRA fitted the requirements of this research project since the core areas of re-
search were conducted by an individual employee of the company (the re-
searcher) working with very limited support from a relatively small and unskilled 
internal group of company personnel. 
9.4 Objective 3 – Performing an ISRA on the company’s IT infrastructure 
The fulfilment of the third objective required extensive preparation for the pro-
cesses involved in conducting the OCTAVE Allegro ISRA on selected areas of 
the company’s existing IT infrastructure. From the outset it was ensured that 
senior management were fully informed, committed and available when neces-
sary to provide active support to the risk assessment process. Company per-
sonnel with relevant skill sets were recruited to assist the project team with the 
risk assessment process. They were trained how to perform the OCTAVE Alle-
gro ISRA during several in-house workshop sessions. Importance was placed 
on those who had knowledge and experience in working within the operational 
areas of the business that the risk assessment was to be focused on. 
The data collected from the assessment helped both the research team and 
senior management to understand how the component parts of the company’s 
IT systems assisted with their daily business functions and clearly identified the 
impact on the business should these systems fail due to breaches of security. 
The company’s internal ERP system was identified as the most critical infor-
mation asset of greatest concern that could be directly or indirectly threatened. 
Guidance, worksheets and examples from the supporting Allegro documenta-
tion provided the assessment team with a structured path when performing the 
risk assessment. The simplicity of the OCTAVE Allegro methodology helped 
considerably in reducing company human resources and minimising the time 
spent on the ISRA. 
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9.5 Objective 4 – Proposing a development plan from the results of the ISRA 
The fourth and final research objective involved the proposal of a development 
plan from the results of the ISRA. This was to assist the company with the im-
plementation of the necessary information system security control improve-
ments and an information security awareness-training programme across the 
company. The OCTAVE Allegro’s risk mitigation prioritisation process for the 
identified risks provided senior management with a clear view of what needed to 
be achieved to immediately improve the company’s weakest links in their IT 
systems security. This information together with further detailed research ena-
bled the assessment team to propose five risk mitigation proposals – one for 
each of the five areas of concern (threat areas). 
The majority of this objective was achieved with the detailed mitigation pro-
posals, which are outlined in chapter seven of this report. Recommendations for 
future development of IT system security, building on the first company specific 
Allegro risk assessment, provided a solid foundation for further similar assess-
ments to be conducted at regular intervals in the future. Although the company 
managed to successfully complete this ISRA the implementation of a company-
wide information security awareness training programme and more advanced 
testing such a ‘penetration testing’ techniques would be required. These ele-
ments are recommended but were unable to be implemented within the limited 
scope of this research project.   
9.6 Comment – Limitations of the research project 
The scope of this report was significantly reduced after it had commenced. The 
Company Board of Directors advised senior management that, due to unfore-
seen circumstances, the human resources and funding previously envisaged 
should be scaled back and rationalised. This meant that it would not be possible 
to conduct in-depth analysis on industry standard information controls. 
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This report also highlighted that due to the continually evolving operational envi-
ronment of the company a single OCTAVE Allegro risk assessment only provid-
ed a snapshot indication of the health of specified areas of the existing IT sys-
tems security. It was also identified that in order to obtain long-term benefit from 
the conducted OCTAVE Allegro assessment the company would need to per-
form further assessments at regular intervals over the forthcoming years. The 
future success of the recommended IT systems security improvements is inter-
dependent with continued company-wide support of senior management and in 
promoting and enforcing security awareness. Due to the limitations of this re-
search project the period following the completion of this report will be critical to 
the success or failure of the company’s information security protection strategy 
and mitigation plans. 
OCTAVE Allegro is a lean risk assessment method and does not provide guid-
ance in selecting security controls. A comprehensive list of controls and control 
objectives intended to address specific requirements identified via a formal risk 
assessment are provided in ISO/IEC 270002, from the ISMS family of interna-
tional standards. ISO/IEC 270002 would have been utilised extensively to assist 
with the creation of fully customised company-specific information security con-
trols. However, this was not possible with the reduced project scope, resources 
and funding allocated by the company to this research project. 
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